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REM SLEEP PATTERNING AND DREAM RECALL IN
CONVERGERS AND DIVERGERS
Michael Holmes
"The form and direction of drive discharge is
coordinated with, if not limited and selected
by, defensive organizations This does not
mean that style and defense organization are
identical, but it does imply that, in the main,
both are tools of cognition, used primarily in
its dealings with the internal needs of the
organism."
(David Rapaport in Organization and the Pathology
of Thought, 19^1)
I declare that this thesis has been composed by myself
and that the investigation described herein has been
designed and carried out by myself.
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INTRODUCTION
It is often difficult to recall just how one
first stumbled on an idea. Almost inevitably -
directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously -
the first formulation rests on plagiarism. In this
case, my research sprang from a footnote in Liam
Hudson's Contrary Imaginations:
"It would be interesting to know, too, whether
convergers and divergers differed in the nature
of their dreams. One might predict that
convergers are more likely to forget their
dreams rapidly and completely."1
Liam Hudson himself attributes the suggestion to
Oliver Zangwill. Finding myself saying, "Now why didn't
I think of that?", I was hooked. Hurriedly putting
together a research design, I approached Liam Hudson -
only to find that another of his students, Mark Austin,
had already embarked on the very same study. By this
time, indeed, the data were being analysed. The
results were highly encouraging - convergers were poorer
than divergers at recalling their dreams. The problem
now was one of interpretation. What was needed was a
more discriminating design. At this point, Mark Austin
bowed out - the rigours of all-night sessions were not
to his taste - and I stepped into the breach.
My research brings together three quite disparate
strands - psychoanalytic theory, mental testing and the
electrophysiological recording techniques of the sleep
1 Hudson (1966), p. 98.
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laboratory. This proved, at times, an uneasy marriage.
Psychological researchers, striving for scientific
respectability, typically view psychoanalytic theory
with the utmost suspicion. An entertaining theory
for lighter moments, to be sure, but not one on which
to base research. Certainly, the processes which
concern psychoanalytic theory do not, by their very
nature, surrender readily to a direct research attack.
As a result, psychoanalysis has generated little by way
of experiment for a theory of such long standing. Yet,
if psychology is not to remain largely 'academic', it
should incorporate just such theories as psychoanalysis
within its scope - not as some global doctrine, but as a
series of hypotheses worthy of empirical scrutiny. The
methodology must be found to fit the subject matter,
2
rather than allowing 'the cult of the fact' to stultify
and trivialise psychology's concerns. That my
methodology should lead me to sift physiological data
is hardly surprising. After all, psychoanalytic theory
views motivation as stemming from needs rooted in the
biology of the individual. Indeed, any self-sufficient
psychological theory must consider psychological action
not in isolation but along with underlying biological
processes: only in Wonderland can we have the grin
without the cat.
2 See Hudson (1972).
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SUMMARY
This thesis investigates the hypothesis that
convergent and divergent thinking reflect different
defensive preferences - convergers inclining towards
repression, divergers to intellectual modes of defence.
To test this claim, individuals' reactions to
their own dreams - a rich source of threatening material,
according to psychoanalytic theory - were investigated.
Utilising all-night electrophysiological monitoring of
sleep, recall following awakenings from REM (dream)
sleep was contrasted for convergent and divergent groups.
The convergers did prove poorer at recalling dream
content, but only from those awakenings that, it had been
postulated, might elicit threatening material. Convergers'
recall of non-threatening material ('control' awakenings)
actually proved slightly better than for their divergent
counterparts. These findings were taken to support the
view that convergers more typically resort to repressive
defensive measures.
Comparing REM sleep between the two groups on
undisturbed nights, divergers were found to spend more
time nightly in this stage of sleep than convergers. In
addition, the REM sleep of divergers was characterised by
a much lower density of eye movements. A closer analysis
revealed that divergers spent much more time in
substantial episodes of REM sleep without eye movements.
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This finding was taken to reflect a divergent preference
for intellectual modes of defence, having previously
speculated that, during these episodes without eye
movements, secondary revision of threatening dream
experience may occur. The lower density of eye
movements discharged by divergers was also attributable,
in part, to a tendency for convergers to spend more time
in episodes of sustained eye movement activity. Moreover,
convergers exhibited a longer first period of REM sleep
than divergers (against the overall trend) and a shorter
REM sleep latency - all of which suggest a greater need
for REM sleep and, arguably, its psychological concomitant,
dreaming. This pattern was seen as support for
psychological compensation, convergers making up for less




CONVERGENT AND DIVERGENT THTNKING AND DEFENSIVE BEHAVIOUR
Hie tradition of intelligence testing goes back to
the pioneering efforts of such men as Binet, Terraan and
Thorndike during the early years of the present century.
This work firmly established the intelligence test as the
technique for sorting the bright from the dull, a position
it still enjoys today. After this initial burst of
innovation, however, progress slackened. The pursuit of
more subtle mental tests was abandoned as mental testers
became engrossed in the complexities surrounding the factor
analytic extraction of the 'structure1 of the intellect.
One consequence of this involvement was that thoughts
turned away from the question of the predictive power of
the intelligence test.
This neglect was brought home by Terman's monumental
study in which he followed more than fifteen hundred
'gifted' children1 into adulthood (Terman & Oden, 19^7»
1959). Many of his cases, true to form, had successful
careers, but many others did not. What appeared to
distinguish the successes from the failures was not
differences of an intellectual nature, but those of a
1 Those with I.Q.s of 1^0 or over.
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personal or social kind. This inability on the part of
•intelligence' tests to discriminate the successful from
the less so has been confirmed in subsequent studies.
Future Open Scholars at Oxford and Cambridge, for example,
are distinguished from their peers not by their X.Q.
ratings but by their tendency to work hard and by their
breadth of extracurricular interests (Hudson, 1964). In
fact, men of eminence from a variety of walks of life-
perform no better on these tests than their less successful
colleagues (Roe, 1953? MacKinnon, 1962a, 1962b). Indeed,
beyond a comparatively moderate level,^ there appears to be
no association whatsoever between intelligence test
performance and creative achievement.
This failure on the part of intelligence tests was
taken up by Guilford in his presidential address to the
American Psychological Society in 1950. What were needed,
and what he proposed, were new mental tests that would
ensnare the abilities associated with creativity. During
succeeding years, Guilford and his associates devised a
2 Interestingly, even as exhaustive an assessment as
Final Honours examinations fares no better in the prediction
stakes. Tangible success in such widely differing fields
as scientific research (as evidenced by FRSs and DScs);
politics (Cabinet Ministers versus non-Cabinet Ministers
versus backbench MPs); and law (High Court versus County
Court Judges) bears little or no relation to class of degree
obtained (Hudson, 1,58, 1960, 1961).
3 This level appears to be around an I.Q. of 120
(MacKinnon, 1962b).
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number of these tests and isolated a number of specific
'creativity1 factors - 'fluency' factors, 'flexibility'
factors and an 'originality' factor (see e.g., Guilford,
1956, 1959). These factors were seen as sub-processes
of 'divergent' thinking - the thought process that
Guilford regarded as generating original, creative ideas.
In contrast, the more conventional intelligence test tapped
the process of 'convergent' thinking - the ability to
'home', or converge, on the single correct answer.
The concept of divergent thinking is best defined
in terms of the tests designed to measure the process.
Much as with conventional intelligence tests, divergent
thinking tasks take many forms, verbal and non-verbal,
visual and non-visual. Subjects have been asked to
provide as many different meanings of particular everyday
words as spring to mind} to come up with as many uses as
possible for everyday objects; to think of different
titles for a story plot; to describe as many different
pictures as they can 'see' in certain patterns; and so
on. 'Fluency' is determined by the absolute frequency
of responses; 'flexibility* by the number of categories
of response; and 'originality' by the number of unique
or unusual responses (in a statistical sense). Here, in
other words, the individual is invited to think tangentially,
to associate in a loose fashion - in short, to diverge.
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The next step was to determine whether these
divergent thinking tests did, in fact, discriminate the
creative from the non-creative* The findings proved
disappointing. These so-called 'creativity' tests
fared little better than the conventional 'intelligence'
tests as indicators of originality in practice (MacKinnon,
1962a, 1962b). Armed with this knowledge, the test
critics were not slow on the scene. Referring back to
Guilford's own findings (Wilson, _et al, 1953, 195**;
Guilford e^t al, 1957)» certain commentators (Thortidilce,
1963; Ward, 1966) argued that Guilford had failed to
demonstrate the separability of his 'creativity' tests
from conventional intelligence tests; for the 'creativity*
measures enjoyed little variance in common other than
that they also shared with intelligence test measures.
This argument seems misplaced. For although many
of the earlier studies did find some correspondence between
'creativity' measures and 'intelligence' measures, the
heterogeneity of these measures far outweighs their
homogeneity. In the three Guilford studies under scrutiny,
the average correlation between the two kinds of test
measure was +.17» In other words, the two measures share
less than 3$ of their variance. Clearly, this meagre
association will have little bearing on a possible
relationship between these 'creativity* tests and actual
creative accomplishment. The problem is rather whether
the divergent thinking factors share enough variance among
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themselves to be regarded as measuring anything in
common. Taken together, the 'creativity1 factors
correlated, on average, +.20 in the same three studies.
One particular 'creativity' factoi. 'fluency',
correlated, on average, +.30 across the various tests,
and only +.13 with intelligence tests. This is still
on the low side by intelligence test standards. But
Guilford may have assumed, quite reasonably, that the
abilities on which creativity depend are, by their very
nature, more diverse and less consistent than those on
which formal reasoning depend.*1 There was still reason
to hope that some, if not all, of his factors would have
predictive powers. As we shall see, they do - if not in
the direction Guilford intended. In his own defence,
Guilford may at least point out that he did not approach
the problem wearing a psychological blindfold, drawing
his factors, and thereafter his tests, from statistical
data alone. To Guilford, the tests did have face
validity; they looked the part.
4. Correlational data may, in any case, have little
bearing on the psychological unity of a trait. The
various 'creativity' factors may tap alternative, but
functionally equivalent, strategies leading to creative
accomplishment: in which case, high inter-correlations
between the factors should not necessarily be expected.
This type of situation has been found in a study of
academically successful students. It turned out that,
among the most successful, each student was either high
in I.Q. or very widely read, or exceptionally hard
working, and the inter-correlations between the three
variables were effectively nil (Hudson, 1961). This
point has been developed by Hudson (19V5)•
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Wallach & Kogan (1965) attributed the relative
lack of success in distinguishing 'creativity' and
•intelligence' tests to the conditions and atmosphere
in which the tests had been administered. They argued
that Guilford had adhered too closely to the conventional
testing procedures which were more likely to promote
convergent than divergent thinking. As a result, in
their study on primary school children, Wallach & Kogan
took care to ensure that all the divergent thinking
measures were collected in situations designed to minimise
•test anxiety'. They used teachers well-known to the
children as 'experimenters' and the tasks were completed
during 'games' and 'lessons' without giving any clue to
the children that they were being tested. There were
five divergent thinking tests in all, each scored for
'fluency' and 'uniqueness'. The tests were given untimed.
The average inter-correlation among the ten measures was
+ .41; among the five 'fluency' measures, +.46; and
among the five 'uniqueness* measures, +.43. In contrast,
the average correlation between the divergent thinking
and intelligence measures was only +.09. As Wallach &
Kogan's sample was unselected on general intelligence,
these findings are all the more remarkable. Other studies
using this non-evaluative test procedure have confirmed
the influence of this approach. In a recent study with
older schoolchildren (again using an unselected sample),
correlations between visual and non-visual 'fluency'
measures of +.51 were obtained, and between these measures
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and an intelligence test (AII5) the correlation was +.10.
With a selected (student) sample, the correlation
between intelligence test performance and a single verbal
'fluency' test dropped to +.01.-'
Removing the evaluative context from the
administration of divergent thinking tests had
effectively neutralised the relationship between these
tests and the more conventional type of intelligence test.
But it had done much more besides. Without the test aura,
many subjects' expression loosened; they felt free to be
ambiguous, to compromise, to strain credulity, to be
irrational - to diverge, not just in a dry, intellectual
way, but in a wealth of personal ways.
Convergence and Divergence - A Contrast in Style
While these tests of divergent thinking may
have failed in their original purpose, they have
illuminated the presence of contrasting cognitive
'styles', particularly in individuals of above-
average intelligence. For some individuals exhibit
a striking bias in their performance on convergent and
divergent thinking tests. On the one hand, there is the
5 These findings refer to unpublished data obtained by
Margaret Corraack, James McGuire, Peter Sheldrake and
myself from samples screened for other experiments at
the Research Unit on Intellectual Development in
Edinburgh. The school sample numbered 119» the student
sample 15^.
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individual who responds competitively to the rigours
of the conventional intelligence test but shies away
from the novelty of divergent thinking tests; on the
other, the individual who dislikes the uncompromising,
restricting approach required by the intelligence test
but revels in the freedom of expression encouraged in
the divergent thinking tasks.
These contrasting cognitive styles have proved
to be enduring characteristics once formed (Povey, 1970)>
and a substantial body of research now exists linking
these intellectual biases with other aspects of an
individual's life. Two major studies, in particular,
have unearthed a number of more personal characteristics
typical of those exhibiting these styles of thinking.
The first of these was carried out by Getzels and
Jackson (1962) in America; the second, by Hudson (1966,
1968) in England. Xn both cases, the populations under
study were decidedly bright, senior schoolchildren.0
6 Getzels and Jackson's findings refer to both boys and
girls; Hudson's refer predominantly to boys. Hudson did
not find the same consistent link between convergent and
divergent thinking bias and more personal attributes among
girls that he did with boys. In view of the very different
cultural pressures brought to bear on boys and girls, this
is hardly surprising. Moreover, there is some evidence
to suggest that convergent and divergent thinking bias in
girls is influenced by variations in the menstrual cycle
(Cormack & Sheldrake, 197*0 • That Getzels and Jackson's
data allowed them to treat the two sexes together may be
explained, at least in part, by differences in treatment
of boys and girls in America and England.
Getzels and Jackson referred to those subjects
exhibiting a bias toward convergent thinking as *high
I.Q.s* and those exhibiting a divergent thinking bias
as 'high creatives1} Hudson, more simply, as
•convergers* and •divergers*, respectively - the
terminology to be adopted here.
One of the most striking differences encountered
between convergers and divergers is in the attitudes and
values they display. Getzels and Jackson found that,
while both groups agree as to the qualities favoured by
their teachers, only convergers incorporate these values
in their *self ideals*. Divergers, on the other hand,
develop their own values showing a quite remarkable
disregard for those of their teachers . ' Hudson (1968)
also found that divergers are less likely to acquiesce
when confronted with the opinion of an authority figure.
Getzels and Jackson suggest that this independence on the
part of divergers reflects their •internal locus of
g
evaluation*. But there may also be an element of
perversity in their separate stance. For the qualities
7 For example, convergers stress the importance of
conventions such as *high marks', *high I.Q*, and 'goal
directedness'; divergers set more store by a sense of
humour.
8 If this were the case, one would expect to find
that divergers are more introverted than convergers.
In fact, no difference has been found between the two
groups on the Maudsley Personality Inventory (Hudson,
1968).
divergers preferred for themselves actually correlated
negatively (-.25) with the qualities believed favoured
by their teachers (Getzels and Jackson, 1962).
Moreover, Hudson (1968) reported that divergers tuold a
rather antagonistic view of authority figures. When
faced with an 'authority situation', vaguely depicted,
and allowed to put their own interpretation on the
scene, divergers proved more likely than convergers to
see the authority figure as menacing. Teachers, too,
may sense this. Certainly, Getzels and Jackson's
divergers were less liked by their teachers than were
their convergers, although both groups excelled at
scholastic work.
In response to a 'Personal Qualities Questionnaire
Hudson (1966) found that convergers express authoritarian
socially conforming and rigid attitudes more frequently
than divergers. Convergers are more likely to approve
of being obedient, and of having a low opinion of
themselves; and to disapprove of being independent of
their parents. They are also more likely to approve of
mixing well socially, of being a good team member, of
being personally neat and tidy, and of being very well-
mannered; and to disapprove of 'arty' clothes, and bad
language. And they are more likely to approve of
accepting expert advice, and having set opinions; and to
disapprove of being highly imaginative and of artistic
sensitivity.
Hudson also found consistent differences in
response to controversial statements: convergers
again expressing more conservative, conforming tastes;
divergers' tone being more liberal and non-authoritarian
For example, divergers are more likely to favour freedom
of choice in reading; and to show hostility toward
apartheid, Boy Scouts and the Combined Cadet Force.
Divergers also proved more likely to adopt minority
attitudes - a factor that may have had a considerable
bearing on their responses. In other words, once again
divergers' choice may have been dictated by a desire to
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be perverse, to discomfort others. This may well
explain the puzzling contradictions encountered in the
divergers' responses. For the divergers' l.beralism
broke down in a most alarming way, with the majority of
them supporting caning at school and fox hunting. The
latter seems particularly perplexing as, elsewhere, they
approve strongly of 'fondness for animals', more so than
the convergers.10
9 Interestingly, one of the few items on the
Extraversion Scale of the Maudsley Personality Inventory
to discriminate between convergers and divergers was,
"Do you like to play pranks upon others?"; divergers
were more likely to reply in the affirmative (Hudson,
1968).
10 In this connection, Getzels and Jackson note that
divergers are more likely to express an interest in a
veterinary career.
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Turning to the test material, the open-ended
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tasks discriminate in a host of ways between convergers
and divergers. Both Getzels and Jackson and Hudson report
a very similar pattern of response. Convergers' responses
have been variously described as factual, specific,
rational, precise, serious, impersonal, unimaginative,
'stimulus-bound', and so on. Divergers' responses, on
the other hand, are non-specific, playful, humorous,
ambiguous, personal and emotional, imaginative, 'stimulus-
free', and violent. Convergers* responses seem superficial
and aloof} divergers seem to put personal meaning into
theirs. Convergers persist with one theme, often resorting
to detailed analysis; divergers flit from one theme to
another, without pause for analysis or reflection.
Convergers seem less willing to risk the possibility of
error, or of being misunderstood; divergers seem more
willing to leave something to the imagination of others.
Convergers show more interest in things than in people;
divergers, people rather than things.
One further point seems worthy of mention.
Convergers have shown themselves to be quite capable of
producing more imaginative, personal material in certain
11 The term adopted by Hudson. 'Creativity' test seems
hardly appropriate in view of the test's failure to predict
in this area. 'Divergent thinking' test is also rather
misleading since the convergent/divergent distinction
rests on a bias between the two types of test, not on the
open-ended tests alone. In fact, Hudson (1968)
demonstrated that bias is more than twice as discriminative
of arts/science differences (see below ) than open-ended
test scores.
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circumstances. In one study, Hudson (1968) changed
the presentation of the 'Uses of Objects' test. On
this occasion, instead of open-ended instructions, the
test required ten responses for each item and also gave
examples of the breadth of possible responses. In this
situation, convergers produce responses of a much more
divergent nature. Hudson devised a second experiment
that also draws out this latent capacity. Convergers
were asked to tackle a 'Uses of Objects* test as if they
were an 'an uninhibited, rather bohemian figure' who 'often
says things for effect, and likes to shock people with
coarse or gruesome jokes'. Donning this mantle,
convergers once again produced a far richer array of
responses than seemed possible from their previous
attempts. One further piece of evidence, from Getzels
and Jackson's study, illustrates the same process. In
respect of their career aspirations, convergers are much
less likely than divergers to offer unconventional
choices. However, when Getzels and Jackson employed
a projective technique - which involved asking their
subjects to attribute career choices to others -
convergers* unconventional choices increased and,
statistically, the difference between the two groups
disappeared. Each of these strands of evidence, in
drawing attention to the convergers' ability to respond
in a fashion typical of the diverger, serves to highlight
the restraint normally imposed by those who think in
a convergent manner. Apparently, convergers' expression
loosens only when responsibility for their responses does
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not fall on them themselves: when their choice is not
reflected.
The characteristic open-ended test responses
of the converger, in particular, led G-etzels and Jackson
to conclude that convergent thinking is one manifestation
of a more general defensive disposition. Divergent
thinking, in contrast, was taken to reflect essentially
an 'openness' to experience, a relatively non-defensive
orientation. Hudson (1966), on the other hand, sees
both biases as defensive in nature; for the almost
compulsive 'openness* displayed by divergers has a hollow
ring to it. What differs rather are the defensive
strategies typically employed by the two groups:
convergers resorting to inhibition or repression;
divergers more to intellectualisation. On this
interpretation, convergers' unwillingness to enter into
the spirit of open-ended tests is seen as one symptom of
a more general inhibition in tackling the non-rational
aspects of life, notably those of an emotional, personal
nature; and the divergers' 'open' verbal fluency as a
deception, cloaking a more subtle censorship.
Hudson (1966) has also drawn attention to the
close association between convergence and divergence
on the one hand and academic specialisation on the
other. In his population of English schoolboys,
physical science specialists were much more likely to be
convergent and arts specialists to be divergent.
This in itself seems to contest the view that open-
ended tests measure creativity. It also raises
problems for an explanation of convergent and divergent
thinking revolving round deep-rooted defensive structures
For convergent and divergent thinking may be the result
of academic specialisation - a superficial adoption
of the •mores' of the respective disciplines.
Alternatively, and in keeping with the defence
hypothesis, the possession of a convergent or divergent
personality may be a predisposing factor underlying an
individual's subsequent choice of subject. The little
information we have bearing on this question favours
the notion that the ontogeny of convergence/divergence
does precede academic specialisation. One major study,
employing ten and eleven year olds, demonstrated the
presence of convergent and divergent thinking at this
age (Wallach & Kogan, 19^5)• Recently, it has been
suggested that the precursors of convergent and
divergent intellectual bias may be present as early
as the pre-school child (Hutt & Bhavnani, 1972). Three
to five year olds, categorised according to their
12 As American schoolchildren do not specialise to
the same extent, Getzels and Jackson were unable to make
a similar comparison. However, they did find difference
in the career aspirations of convergers and divergers
that support Hudson's findings. For example, convergers
were more likely to plump for engineering and
architecture, and science; divergers for writing, art,
entertaining and dancing.
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responses to a new toy, were followed up and retested
for open-ended test performance some four years later.
The investigators found that overt exploratory
behaviour rated for imaginativeness at the pre-school
stage was an excellent predictor of subsequent open-
ended test performance, particularly with boys.
Unfortunately, there is no mention of intelligence tests
being administered to the children, and it may be that
what was measured was no more than a difference between
bright and dull children.
Whatever the age at which convergent and divergent
thinking biases first emerge, it would seem to precede
academic specialisation. Nevertheless, it is still
likely that academic traditions and style acquired after
specialisation sharpen any differences already present.
In support of this assertion, Hudson (1966) found that
arts and science specialists, as groups, become increasingly
divergent and convergent respectively with the passage of
time.^
If, as the main investigators have proposed, the
convergent/divergent distinction reflects differences
of a deep rooted nature, then this link between academic
discipline and convergence/divergence raises more problems
than it solves. What of the individual who finds himself
13 It is worth noting that this was not 'longditudinal•
evidence from the same individuals. This effect may
result from 'misfit1 individuals switching subjects
rather than their yielding to academic influence.
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in the 'wrong' academic environment - the converger
surrounded by artists; the diverger in the austere
world of the scientist? Do these 'misfits' yield to
the pressure exerted by their academic milieu? And
if they do, is this yielding anything more than the
forming of a 'crust' - a superficial response
repertoire that to some extent mimics an academic
style but is not 'driven' by the individual's underlying
personality? If individuals do yield in this superficial
way, what effect does this have on their defences? In
order to preserve their self-identity, do misfit
convergers and divergers actually intensify their
defensive orientation in this situation? if 'misfits'
display an extreme convergent/divergent bias relative
to their academic group but only a mild bias relative
to the academic community as a whole, are we to regard
them as mild or extreme convergers/divergers in the
wider sense of personality? Finally, do convergers
and divergers react in similar ways to this dilemma?
We have little evidence to guide us. Yet these are
problems of utmost importance, and ones that will be
touched upon in the present study. Unfortunately,
this was only of tangential concern here, but even in
this brief encounter, these 'misfits' left the author
with a very real sense of their conflict.
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Convergence and Divergence - A Developmental Model
Hudson (1972) has incorporated this link between
cognitive style and academic specialisation, and more
particularly the defensive styles that convergers and
divergers appear to display, within a developmental
framework. He has suggested that convergers and divergers'
personalities 'gel' or 'fixate' at different stages during
the course of development. Convergers fixate early, during
the 'latency' period, a time of conscious preoccupation
with the acquisition of impersonal skills - with ideas,
symbols, and abstractions rather than people - aided and
abetted by the rigorous control of infantile, emotional
impulses. Divergers, in contrast, fixate later, during
adolescence, at which time the teenager once again
grapples with the emotional turbulence that has been
repressed since infancy. Rather than directly expressing
these emotions, as in infancy, the adolescent resorts to
symbolic re-creation and, in so doing, intellectualises
his raw drives. Certainly, the converger/scientist's
attention to detail, his concern with accuracy, bears
more than a passing resemblance to the pre-adolescent
child? in contrast, the divergent/arts style seems the
very antithesis, reflecting more the reckless rhetoric of
the adolescent.
The model accounts rather nicely for Hudson's
observation (1968) that, whereas the stereotype of the
scientist is already present in the pre-adolescent
child, the stereotype of the arts specialist takes
shape later, during adolescence.1^ For the stereotypic
scientist embodies the value system prevailing during
the latency period, whereas the arts figure must appear
quite unintelligible to the pre-adolescent child; his
comprehension of this stereotype must await adolescence
and his renewed acquaintance with the personal and
emotional.
The fixation hypothesis generates certain other
predictions that fit available evidence. Certainly,
scientists do appear to avoid interpersonal contacts
(McClelland, 1956; Cattell & Drevdahl, 1955) and,
moreover, this lack of sociability was already present
among ten year olds who subsequently became scientists
(Tferman, 195*0. Budding scientists also commit
themselves to science at a younger age than arts
specialists commit themselves to the arts (Lunt, 1967,
Butler, 1968), More generally, Getzels and Jackson
found that adolescent convergers had already made a
career choice, or at least had narrowed the field.
ih The typical scientist was seen as intelligent,
valuable and dependable, but dull and unimaginative;
the arts specialist as warm, fexciting and imaginative,
but relatively unintelligent, undependable and lacking
in value. The stereotype of the scientist was
already present in the youngest sample tested (11 year
olds); the arts stereotype only gradually crystallised
with successively older samples of schoolboys.
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Divergers' career aspirations, on the other hand, were
less settled, often including unresolved combinations
such as 'law or music*. When convergers and divergers
are asked to rate themselves on certain aspects of Self,
Hudson (1968) found that convergers are much less likely
than divergers to differentiate between either their
•Actual' Self (who they actually were) or their
'Perceived' Self (who their teachers took them to be)
on the one hand and their 'Future' Self on the other.
As Hudson indicated:
"This suggests that by the age of fifteen
or sixteen, convergers are much more
settled than divergers about the kind of
person they expect to become." (p«58).
Also congruent with the fixation hypothesis, is
the idea that convergers sublimate 'aggressive' energies
whereas divergers sublimate impulses of a 'sexual'
nature (Hudson, 1973). If convergent and divergent
thinking are indeed 'driven' by these different
sublimated energies, convergers should be less inclined
to 'act out' aggressive drives directly and divergers
should avoid 'acting out* drives in the sexual sphere.
Tentatively, certain strands of evidence do point
in this direction. Tangential support has come from the
suggestion that physical scientists avoid open
aggressiveness (McClelland, 1962), largely on the basis
of their responses to TAT cards (Roe, 1951} Knapp, 1956).
In an intriguing study, McClelland (1962) asked science
and non-science specialists to rate a list of metaphors
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in terras of how well they described nature. Although
the study had a different purpose in mind, it is interesting
to note that each of the six metaphors least liked by the
scientists (relative to the non-scientists) contained
themes of aggression or uncontrolled power. In contrast,
none of the eleven metaphors liked best by the scientists
(again in relation to the non-science group) were
particularly aggressive in tone.1^ Getzels and Jackson
(1962) reported that convergers were less likely than
divergers to introduce violence into their stories (from
TAT cards) and drawings. Hudson (1966) also found that
convergers offered fewer uses of objects and dmwings
involving personal violence than divergers, although those
they did express were frequently particularly gruesome.
The very strength of these convergent aggressive outbursts
that do find expression suggests that convergers exert
control in this direction.
15 The six metaphors least liked by scientists were:
the desolations of many generations; a tyrant despite
her lovely face; a gireat cave that encompasses us and
swallows us up like atoms; a spring whose waters will not
do our bidding; a Titan waiting terribly to break forth;
an arrogant master who likes to rule and dominate. None of
these metaphors was in fact ranked higher than 50th (out of
59) on average by scientists. The eleven metaphors liked
best by the scientists were : a pillar of strength and
virility; a perfect woman nobly planned; the nurse,
the guide, the guardian of my heart and soul; a grand
and inspiring father; lady of silences; a banquet of
delights; a stern and loveless master; glens of
brightness; a vineyard to be reaped for pleasure;
something certain and infinite; and fairest among women.
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On the reverse side of the coin - and again
suggestive but no more - young husbands who see
themselves as divergent report a lower investment
in • a fulfilling sex life* and a lower rate of orgasm
than young husbands who see themselves as convergent
(Hudson et_ ad, 1973)» Less direct evidence comes from
two studies of the personal lives of arts and science
specialists. Eminent arts specialists proved nearly
five times as likely to remain single; and even if they
did marry, they were more likely to remain childless
(Hudson & Jacot, 1971 ).^ A subsequent large scale study
of American academics also found that arts specialists
are more likely than scientists to remain single and
childless (Hudson, 1973)• Finally, McClelland1s metaphor
study is also of some interest here. For a considerable
proportion of the metaphors most preferred on a relative
basis by the scientists (and therefore least preferred
by the non-scientists) have a decidedly sexual flavotir.
Had the non-science group been restricted to arts
specialists (it also contained social scientists), this
trend may have proved more marked.
16 This sample, 692 in all, drawn from Who1s Who. were
all born between 1900 and 1925 and, at the time of the
study (1969), averaged 57 years. Hence, most of their
lives preceded the advent of the contraceptive pill.
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To take one further retrospective (and
speculative) step, how might this suggested difference
in age of fixation occur? Particularly in early
childhood, attitudes are influenced predominantly by
parental values, usually the mother's with whom the
child has more contact at this stage. It is not
surprising, therefore, to discover that mothers of
convergent schoolchildren stress the importance of
•external' characteristics such as 'studious' and 'well-
mannered' behaviour, whereas mothers of divergers
emphasise 'internal' characteristics, notably 'openness
to experience', u 'sense of values', and 'enthusiasm
for life' (Getzels and Jackson, 1962). Moreover, the
convergent mothers themselves appear to have had an
upbringing that stressed external, material values. It
would seem that convergers and divergers are products of,
respectively, like-minded mothers. As a result, the
unfolding converger and diverger are likely to experience
very different pressures.
In the converger's case, although his mother is
likely to make some pretence, at an overt level, of
expressing feelings of warmth and affection towards her
child, this expression (which is foreign to her nature)
may contrast sharply with her more covert communication.
This 'double talk' places the child in what has been
called a 'double bind' dilemma (e.g., Bateson e^t al, 1956).
The situation may become further aggravated, if, as a
2k
reaction to the embarrassment the child has caused
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her, the mother becomes critical. ' To avoid the
discomfort of this dilemma, the child of the converger
is driven to inhibit the personal, apparently alarming,
side of his nature as soon as the initial emotional
dependence of infancy is outgrown. This resolution
is met with parental i-elief, and further reinforced by
active encouragement of impersonal pursuits. To the
child of the converger, the impersonal world becomes a
sanctuary from the threat of emotions, leading to an
early and strong commitment to these impersonal ideals,
and one not easily shifted even by adolescent upheaval.
While the course open to the child of the converger
is relatively clear, that of the future diverger is less
so. If the divergent child encounters 'double talk'
it is probably in his mother's communication concerning
his practical accomplishments. At the same time,
maternal response to his emotional advances is unequivocal,
pressuring him to cling to infantile emotional dependence
and delaying his transition to the latent stage of
development. Eventually, the constraints of schooling
force the unfolding diverger to take up more impersonal
matters. But his commitment to the factual world is not
the dynamic one of the converger; and the diverger will
17 Apparently a more common reaction among the mothers
of convergers than the mothers of divergers (Getzels and
Jackson, 19^2).
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return to his earlier emotional world with the
broadening of his educational horizons and cushioned by
an increasing symbolic sophistication.
It seems, then, that what little we do know
about the early influences bearing on the future
converger and diverger do suit the model. And there
is a growing body of evidence - much of it, admittedly,
oblique - with which to succour it. Yet the theme
central to the model - the presence of different
defensive orientations in convergers and divergers -
rests on evidence that goes little beyond the anecdotal.
Standing on its own, the convergers' apparent inhibition
on open-ended tests may merely reflect an antipathetic
reaction to tests of an 'unscientific' kind; and,
similarly, divergent fluency may be uncomplicated by any
defensive motivation. If we can confirm this central
theme, not only will we promote Hudson's developmental
model but we will also answer the more pressing question
of whether convergent and divergent thinking do indeed
reflect differences of a deep-rooted nature. It is the
aim of the present investigation to place this suggestion
of a link between convergence/divergence and defensive
orientation on a more experimental footing.
Typically, experimental scrutiny of ego-defence
mechanisms has involved presenting 'standard' stimuli to
'unsuspecting' subjects in the fond hope that they will
react in some specified way to the supposedly
threatening items. Such an approach ignores individual
differences in what is perceived as threatening. More
natural, surely, to study the individual's reactions to
his own psychic experience. One such personal source,
and a particularly rich one, is dreaming.
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CHAPTER 2
SLEEP. DREAMING AND DEFENSIVE BEHAVIOUR
Freud (195*0 was first to emphasise the role
of dreams as a vehicle for the expression of unconscious
•wishes*. These unconscious wishes - which he termed
the •dream-thoughts' - are the real instigators of the
dream, and the dream content reflects the fulfilment of
these wishes. But we do not experience these dream -
thoughts directly; they are disguised. This is necessary,
Freud argued, for the reason that they are unacceptable to
the conscious, socialised mind. Even asleep, the direct
expression of these dream-thoughts would prove too
anxiety-provoking. Instead, in response to the •endopsychic
censorship1 imposed by resistance, the emotionally-charged
dream-thoughts undergo a process of distortion before
gaining admission to the perceptual world of the sleeper.
This distortion is the product of the •dream-work1 -
achieved by means of two processes, 'condensation' and
•displacement'. According to Freud:
"Dream-displacement and dream-condensation
are the two governing factors to whose
activity we may in essence ascribe the form
assumed by dreams." (195**» p. 308).
Condensation refers to the combination of a number of
dream thoughts in a single entity in the manifest dream
content; displacement, to the substitution of one idea,affect
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attribute, person or object for another. A more
general type of displacement, that of form of expression,
also takes place, which usually results in *a colourless
and abstract expression in the dream thoughts being
exchanged for a pictorial and concrete one1 J In
constructing the manifest form of the dream, the dream-
work makes use of 'day residues' (recent waking
experiences). Finally, to complete the disguise, a
process of syrabolisation is adopted, allowing neutral
objects to stand for ones that might pose a threat in
the context of the dream. In this way the anxiety-
provoking nature of the dream, as manifestly expressed,
is removed or lessened, allowing the dream to fulfil its
function of airing these potentially threatening wishes
without disturbing the dreamer's sleep.
Despite the pains taken to disguise the underlying
dream-thoughts, the manifest dream may, nevertheless,
still provoke anxiety. For the ego's sensitivities, if
diminished during sleep, are never entirely lost.
Sometimes, for example, so much anxiety is provoked that
the dreamer awakes and the dream has failed to fulfil its
function as the 'guardian' of sleep. More often,
according to Freud, (and of particular concern here) the
dreamer handles the anxiety provoked by his dreaming in
one of two ways - either by repressing the manifest content
1 Freud, 195^ (p. 339).
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altogether or by resorting to 'secondary revision'.
Repression refers to the expulsion of the dream from
O
consciousness after experiencing it. Secondary
revision refers to the intervention of our waking thoughts
and is not part of the dream thoughts.^ takes the
form of qualifying comments, interpretations and so on,
interpolated or added to the product of the dream-work.
Freud has this to say about the secondary revision of the
dream-work:
"When the dream has come into consciousness,
we treat it exactly the same way that we
treat any content of perception; we try to
fill in the gaps; we add connecting links,
and often we let ourselves in for serious
misunderstanding." (19^9» p. 33)•
In other words, secondary revision may modify dream
experience and, in so doing, serve a defensive function.
One can censor as effectively by addition as substraction.
The effect of putting one interpretation on an experience
is to obscure an alternative, less palatable, interpretation.
2 Freud distinguished between primal repression (barring
the conscious expression of a thought in the first place)
and secondary repression (expelling the thought from the
conscious after experiencing it). Repression of dreams,
as discussed in the present context, always refers to
secondary repression.
3 In Tho Interpretation of Dreams (l95^-)» Freud speaks
of secondary revision as part of the dream-work, but later
(19^9) be abandoned this idea.
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These two methods of defending against the
manifest dream are not mutually exclusive (one may
presumably attempt to revise a dream and subsequently
repress it) but it is my thesis that conver/Tors will be
more likely to invoke repression and divergers to resort
to secondary revision when confronted with dreams of a
threatening, inadequately disgcuised. -ature. If we can
establish this, we not only give substance to the
suggestion that convergers and divergers adopt different
defensive strategies, but also place the activities of
repression and secondary revision of manifest dream
content - neither of which enjoy widespread acceptance -
h
on a more secure footing. Unfortunately, a satisfactory
methodological precedent with which to test our hypothesis
is not to hand. In the case of the repression of dreams,
we do at least have a number of previous studies on which
to build; but in the case of secondary revision, there is
little to guide us. Let us review the developments in
the study of dream repression along with further
developments in the study of sleep and dreaming, in the
hope that these will provide us with sufficient pointers
to secure a discriminating line of experimental attack.
4 This argument, of course, is circular since the
verification of either depends on the other.
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Repression and Home Dream Recall
For long, the only evidence in support of the
repression of dreams was of a clinical, anecdotal nature -
the apparent retrieval of dreams under certain conditions,
such as psycho-analysis, after what appears to be a
•working through of the resistance*. More recent
attempts to support the repression of dreams revolve
round investigations of individual differences in dream
recall. Groups of 'recallers' and 'non-recallers• of
dreams have been identified using questionnaires or
dream diaries. The questionnaire method merely requires
the subject to gauge how frequently he recalls dreaming,
whereas keeping a dream diary involves reproducing any
dream experience recalled on arousal as a daily exercise,
usually lasting several weeks. Using the questionnaire
approach, significant correlations have been obtained
(Tart, 1962} Domhoff & Gerson, 1967)» although not
invariably (Cohen, 1969; Bone _et al, 1970), between
personality tests deemed to measure repression and non-
recall of dreams. One likely source of inconsistency
arising out of the questionnaire design has been highlighted
by the finding that •non-recallers' of dreams on this
index frequently become recallers when asked to keep a
dream diary (Cohen, 1969) or when woken from sleep
(Lewis et_ al, 1966). Despite this objection, classifying
recallers and non-recallers on the basis of dream diaries
has fared no better. While one such study demonstrated
32
a relationship between an objective measure of
repression and failure to recall dreams (Singer & Schonbar,
1961), others have not (Cohen, 1969; Tanck & Robbins,
1970).5
Both questionnaire and dream diary designs suffer
a major methodological shortcoming as means of observing
the effects of repression - namely the lapse in time
between experiencing the dream and being called upon to
recall it. This lapse is usually considerable,
sufficient, at any rate, to allow non-motivated forgetting
to occur. Observations of individual differences in
dream recall may merely reflect variations in the amount
and intensity of dreams experienced or the interest
taken in them. It seems scarcely necessary to invoke
repression in explanation. Moreover, if the majority
of dream forgetting is non-motivated (and the evidence
from electrophysiological studies, to be discussed
shortly, overwhelmingly supports this), then any
evidence that might be taken to support repression will be
submerged. In view of this it is hardly surprising that,
even in the successful studies, very little of the variance
along the recall dimension can be attributed to repression
(Domhoff & Gerson, 1967)#
5 It is perhaps noteworthy that the studies supporting
the action of repression on dream recall (i.e., Singer &
Schonbar, 1961; Tart, 1962; Domhoff & Gerson, 1967) all
used the Welsh Repression Scale (Welsh & Dahlstrom, 1956);
none of the studies reporting negative findings did.
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Clearly, then, any experimental design that
permits an appreciable lapse in time between experiencing
the dream and its subsequent recall is an unsuitable
procedure for measuring the effects of repression. To
meet this objection, it would be necessary to wake the
sleeper during a dream and elicit a recall attempt. On
the long-held assumption that dreaming does not occur
throughout sleep, such an experiment must embody a means
of recognising dream sleep. Fortunately, with the
development; of electrophysiological recording techniques,
just such an experiment can noiir be undertaken. For
dreaming has been associated with a particular pattern
of recording. Let us consider, in some detail, the
research surrounding this discovery.
The Sleep Cycle
The development of the electroencephalogram (EEG)
by Berger in 1929 led to its application in characterising
different levels of sleep by Loomis and his associates
(1937)• They classified the EEG patterns that accompany
the passage from wakefulness to sleep into five types,
A to E. This classification was widely adopted until
Aserinsky & Kleitman (1953» 1955) noted the occurrence
of a particular type of eye movement activity - 'rapid,
jerky and binocularly symmetrical' - during periods of
low-voltage EEG activity. Dement & Kleitman (1957a)» on
the basis of a large number of subsequent all-night
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recordings of undisturbed sleep, defined five EEG stages
of sleep stages 1 to 4, during which, rapid eye
movements (REMs) are absent, referred to collectively
as non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep; and a fifth
stage, REM sleep, which is accompanied by rapid eye
movement activity.
Figure 2.1 shows the electroencephalographic
patterns in the EEG, eye movement in the electrooculograph
(EOG), and muscle tonus in the electromyograph (EMG) which
accompany wakefulness and the different stages of sleep.
During relaxed wakefulness the EEG is composed of
sinusoidal alpha activity (8-12 cps) and low voltage
activity of mixed frequency, accompanied by eye movements,
eye blinks and a high muscle tone. As the subject falls
asleep, his muscles relax and his eyes begin to roll
slowly from side to side, while his EEG gives way to a
stage 1 pattern of relatively low voltage and mixed
frequency. Stage 2 is characterised by 12 to 14 cps
sleep 'spindles', similar in shape to alpha waves but
higher in frequency, together with 'K complexes'"
superimposed on a background of relatively low voltage
and mixed frequency EEG activity. Stages 3 and 4 are
6 K complexes are relatively high amplitude waveforms
exceeding 0.5 sees, in duration, of complex shape -
usually a well-delineated, negative, sharp wave
immediately followed by a positive component and often,
in turn, by sleep spindles. They can occur as a
response to an external stimulus but also occur
spontaneously (Johnson & Karpan, 1968).
FIGURE 2.1



















S tages of sleep as recorded on the electrooculogram (EOG), chin
electromyogram (EMG), and electroencephalogram (central, frontal
occipital tracings). Note the high EMG and eye movements during
wakefulness, compared with the low EMG and rapid eye movements
(REMs) during REM sleep. The EEG is similar during stage 1 and
REM sleep, but the EMG is high and REMs are absent in stage 1.
Stages 2, 3 and 4 are characterised by slowing of frequency and
increase in amplitude of the EEG. (From Berger, 1969).
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defined by high voltage, slow waves of 1 to 2 cps;
when more than half the record consists of this slow-
wave activity, it is classified as stage 4, while
lesser amounts (but greater than 20$) are classified
as stage 3. REM sleep, while displaying a swift,
pinched EEG scrawl similar to that of waking, is
characterised by a low muscle tone (Berger, 1961;
Jacobson ejb ad, 1964) as well as spasmodic bursts of eye
7
movement activity.
The typical distribution of the different stages
of sleep over the course of the night has been mapped in
a number of studies with young adults (Dement & Kleitman,
1957a; Rechtschaffen & Verdone, 1964; Williams et_ al,
1964, 1966; Roffwarg e_t ad, 1966; Feinberg et_ ad, 1967;
Kales e_t ad, 1967a). The consistent findings are
7 A number of other physiological changes have also
been linked to a shift from non-REM to REM sleeps
heart and respiration rates, and systolic blood pressure
have all been found to increase (Aserinsky & Kleitman,
1953; Snyder jet ad, 1964), and particularly their
variability (Jouvet jet al, 1960; Snyder et_ al, 1963»
1964; Shapiro _et al, 1964); rate of neutral discharge
throughout the sensory and motor areas of the brain
increases to levels similar to those found during active
arousal (Huttenlocher, 1961; Evarts, 1962, 1964;
Arduini _et al, 1963); along with an increase in cerebral
blood flow "(Kanzow et_ al, 1962; Reivich et al, 1968),
brain temperature (iCawamura & Sawyer, 1965)» and brain
oxygen consumption (Brebbia & Altshuler, 1965; Kety,
1967); and penile erections most frequently coincide
with periods of REM sleep (Fisher jet al, 1965; Karacan
_et al, 1966).
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represented in Figure 2.2. The initial descending
stage 1 EEG of sleep is usually followed by stages 2,
3 and h in that order. After about seventy minutes,
of predominantly stages 3 and k non-REM sleep, the first
REM (ascending stage 1) period occurs. It is usually
heralded by a series of body movements and a shift in
the EEG to a stage 2 pattern. The first period of REM
sleep tends to be brief and 'broken* (interspersed with
stage 2 EEG features) and is sometimes 'missed'»although
sleep lightens to a stage 2 pattern, the EEG reverts to
stage 3 or 4 after a few minutes, with REM sleep making
its first appearance at the time of the usual second REM
period. From the third cycle of the night, stage 4 is
rarely seen and toward morning the cyclic alternation
may simply be between stage 2 and REM sleep. The later
periods of REM sleep are usually lengthier and, in terms
of the profusion of eye movements, more intense (Foullces,
1966). The REM-NREM sleep cycle averages seventy to
ninety minutes in length and is repeated four to six times
throughout the night, depending on the total length of
sleep. Roughly twenty to twenty-five percent of the
total sleep time of young adults is speni in REM sleep,
five percent in stage 1, as much as fifty percent in stage
2, and twenty percent in stages 3 and 4 combined. The
pattern of sleep from night to night in a single individual
remains relatively constant, except for the first night
spent in the laboratory when the subject takes longer to
fall asleep, tends to awaken spontaneously more frequently,
-p
FIGURE 2.2
A TYPICAL NIGHT OF SLEEP IN A YOUNG ADULT
Rem Sleep
Distribution of sleep stages over the course of the
night. REM sleep occurs periodically throughout the
night, and increasingly toward morning. Individual
periods of REM sleep may vary in length from a few
minutes to an hour or more, and tend to be longer in
the latter half of the night.
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and has less REM sleep than on subsequent nights
(Dement et_ al, 1965; Agnew jet al, 1966). This has
been referred to as the 'first night effect' and
undoubtedly represents the effects of adaptation to
sleeping with electrodes attached in the unusual
environment of a research laboratory.
The Relation between Dreaming and the Sleep Cycle
Prior to the discovery of REM sleep, there had been
a number of studies undertaken to determine whether
dreaming was associated with a particular stage of sleep
as recorded on the EEG. Considered together, the results
of these early studies suggested that dreams could be
recalled following awakening from any stage of sleep
(Blake e_t al, 1939; Davis et_ aJL, 1938; Teplitz, 19^3)*
The cyclic recurrence of REMs, together with an activated
pattern in the EEG somewhat similar to that of wakefulness,
caused Aserinsky & Kleitman (1953» 1955) to ponder on
whether this unique sleep state was the one in which
dreaming occurred. To test this hypothesis, they
subsequently awakened subjects after intervals of sleep
with and without these eye movements. This resulted in:
"Of 27 interrogations during ocular motility
(REMs), 20 revealed detailed dreams usually
involving visual imagery; the replies to
the remaining 7 queries included complete
failure of recall or else 'the feeling of
having dreamed', but with inability to
recollect any detail of the dream. Of 23
interrogations during ocular inactivity, 19
disclosed complete failure of recall, while
the remaining 4 were evenly divided into the
other 2 categories." (1953* PP» 273-4).
4o
Aserinsky & Kleitman concluded that:
"Although no attempt was made to secure
a thorough account of the recalled events
during the extremely brief interrogation,
there were reports revealing strikingly
vivid visual imagery, especially after the
subjects were awakened following the eye
movements. It is indeed highly probable
that the rapid eye movements are directly
associated with visual imagery in dreaming."
(1955, P.9).
The high incidence of recall following awakenings
from REM sleep has been confirmed in a host of subsequent
studies (Table 2.1). However, for NREM awakenings there
has been less consistency among investigations of dream
recall, reported frequencies ranging from 0 to ihrfo.
This wide range appears to be a function of the differing
criteria used to define what mental experience
constitutes a dream. If the definition includes a verbal
report of an experience involving vivid imagery,
frequently of a bizarre or unreal nature, in which the
dreamer may be actively involved, then the 7$ NREM
recall rate originally obtained has been confirmed by
most investigators. However, if a broader category
of cognitive activities is used in defining a dream,
including fragmentary reports of mental phenomena that
may lack sensory imagery and seem closer to everyday
thinking, then figures as high as ih^o have been obtained.




















































































































The qualitative and quantitative differences
between REM and NREM recall have been highlighted by
two studies in which both 'dreaming' and 'thinking'
criteria were employed. Kales tst al (1967b) found
that judging reports for the 'presence of any sensory
imagery with development and progression of the mental
activity* produced recall in 81$ of REM and only 7$ of
NREM awakenings. In contrast, 'thinking' reports were
recalled in only 2$ of REM but 28$ of NREM awakenings.
A similar finding has been reported by Goodenough e_t al
(1965a) in a study in which the subjects classified their
own reports as 'dreaming' and 'thinking'. In fact, it
appears that, regardless of the retrievability of content,
subjects usually maintain that they were dreaming
following REM, but not NREM, awakenings (Kremen, 1961).
Moreover, experienced judges, working 'blind' have been
able to discriminate REM reports from NREM reports with
90$ success (Munroe crt al, 1965). These reports were
also divided into those that had the typical features
of dreams and those that were more like waking thinking.
Faced with these two groups of reports, the judges were
still able to distinguish REM-'thinking' from NREM-
'thinking* and REM-'dreaming' from NREM-'dreaming' with
considerable success.
Although the above data are highly suggestive,
they do not actually demonstrate that dreaming (as
against thinking) is an ongoing process during REM sleep.
It is possible, for example, that the dreams occurred
at some other time, but were better recalled during
REM sleep. This is plausible since, as the EEG attests,
REM sleep is a state of relative arousal. Moreover,
there is evidence that material learned prior to retiring
is recalled better following REM than NREM awakenings
(Stones, 1973).8
If dreaming does occur during REM sleep, the
length of the dream report should be related to the
amount of REM sleep prior to awakening. Manipulating
thesamount of REM sleep preceding awakenings, Dement &
Kleitman (1957b) found that subjects guessed accurately,
on the basis of their dream narratives, whether they
had been dreaming for the shorter (5 minutes) or longer
(15 minutes) period. The investigators also showed
that for each subject, the length of the dream narratives
(number of words) increased with the duration of REM
sleep. Indeed, Dement (1958) has shown that the acting
out, in waking life, of the content of the dream narrative
takes about as long as the duration of REM sleep from
which the dream was taken.
8 This line of argument must offer an explanation for
the better retention of * thinking' experiences than the
more vivid 'dreaming' experiences following NREM
awakenings. One possibility is that the thoughtlike
experiences may occur while the subject is awakening.
This suggestion draws some support from the higher
incidence of thinking reports elicited following gradual
awakenings from NREM sleep than following abrupt awakenings
(Goodenough et al, 1965a; Shapiro et al, 1963> 1965).
kk
Additional evidence supporting the temporal
location of dream-like experience in REM sleep comes
from the observation that auditory, visual or tactile
stimuli presented during REM sleep are frequently
incorporated into subsequently reported dreams (Dement
& Wolpert, 1958; Berger, 1963). The lengths of
experienced time between the incorporated stimulus
event and the end of the dream correlates well with the
real time between the stimulus presentation and the
9
subsequent awakening.
Finally, it has been suggested that the eye
movements actually represent the scanning of hallucinated
dream images. Dement & Kleitman (l957t>), Dement &
Wolpert (1958) and Roffwarg ejb a_L (1962) have all
described correspondences between reported visual dream
imagery and the patterns of eye movements occurring
immediately prior to awakenings from REM sleep. In
the most detailed analysis, Roffwarg and his associates
were able, when dream recall was vivid, to accurately
predict the direction, timing and sequence of eye
movements from the dream protocols alone in 70$ to 80$
of the instances without recourse to the EOG tracings.
9 Incorporation of external stimuli into cognitive
experiences recalled following NREM awakenings is rare
(Rechtschaffen et al, 1963)» and correlations of the
subjective duraTion of conscious experience with the
duration of the preceding period of NREM sleep have not
been reported.
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A number of findings have been taken to
discredit this scanning hypothesis, however. In
particular, the presence of eye movements during REM
sleep in neonates (Roffwarg ejfc al, 1966) and the
congenitally blind (Gross e_t al, 19&5; Amadeo &
Gomez, 1966) have usually been taken (e.g., Berger,
1967; Oswald, 1970) as contrary evidence. Presumably,
there is no visual imagery associated with the eye
movements in these cases. But as far as disproving
the scanning hypothesis, these findings would seem
irrelevant - as irrelevant as deducing from the presence
of mouth movements and vocalisations in the unschooled
congenitally deaf and dumb that similar phenomena in
normals can have no specific relation to meaningful
verbalised content. Obviously they can. In a similar
fashion, eye movements present at birth may become linked
to scanning with the development of visual dreaming.
Of more relevance, perhaps, are the objections
based on normal data. The presence of visual imagery
in the absence of rapid eye movements - during NREM
sleep (Foulkes, 1962) and, particularly, the onset of
sleep (Foulkes et_ al, 1966; Foulkes & Vogel, 19^5;
Molinari & Foulkes, 19&9) - has been cited as 'difficult
to reconcile1 with the scanning hypothesis (Berger, 1969).
However, this finding hardly precludes the possibility
of a close link between eye movement patterning and the
visual imagery of the dream where eye movements are
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permitted expression. More difficult to discoimt are
the consistent individual biases in predominance of
REMs in either a horizontal or vertical plane (Spreng
et al, 1968). Such constancies in patterns of eye
movements do appear inconsistent with the notion that
they are visual scanning movements as dreams differ
considerably in their visual content from one period
of REM sleep to another and from one night to another.
What of the NREM awakenings that elicit dreamlike
reports? It might be argued that these reports reflect
the 'holding', or 're-running', of preceding experiences,
originally encountered in REM sleep, during their
subsequent cognitive elaboration or conceptual synthesis.
The 'flow' of many dreams collected during laboratory
studies does nothing to discredit this notion; and
there is little reason to suppose that secondary
revision cannot take place during both REM and NREM
sleep. Moreover, an interaction between mental content
taken from REM and NREM sleep has been demonstrated
(Rechtschaffen, Vogel & Shaikun, 19&3).
It is probable that mental activity does not
totally cease at any time during sleep, a view that is
widely held (e.g., Foulkes, 1967a; Berger, 1967;
Dement, 1967); a conscious stream of thought persisting
throughout sleep. And although the findings do not allow
us to assert that all dreams occur during REM sleep, or
even that all REM sleep is associated with dreaming,
nevertheless the very strong relationship existing
between the two does allow us to recognise, gain access
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to and interrupt ongoing dream experience with a high
degree of probability.
REM Sleep Awakenings as a M.eans of Testing Repression
Despite this recognition of the association
between REM sleep and dreaming, little investigation
of the influence of repression on dream recall
following awakenings from REM sleep has resulted.
Perhaps this is due, in part, to the view that dreams
collected in the laboratory are more mundane than those
collected at home (Domhoff & Kamiya, 1964; Hall & Van
de Castle, 1966). For if the laboratory context does
exert a constraining effect, making dreams more mundane,
then (or so the argument runs) this would reduce the
frequency of dreams that may be suitable candidates for
10repression. However, this drawback may be more
apparent than real.
Firstly, the nature of home recall conditions
are such that presumably only the most vivid dreams, and
those occurring just before morning arousal, stand a
10 The assumption that apparently 'mundane* dreams are
not threatening to the dreamer may in itself be misguided.
Freud has this to say on the question of mundane dreams:
"When I have reconstructed the dream-thoughts, I
habitually find the most intense psychical impulses in
them striving to make themselves felt and struggling as
a rule against others that are sharply opposed to them.
If I then turn back to the dream, it not infrequently
appears colourless, and without emotional tone of any
great intensity. The dream-work has reduced to a level
of indifference not only the content but often the
emotional tone of my thoughts as well." (1954, p. 467).
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chance of surviving the night's sleep: in fact the
two appear related since, in laboratory studies,
dreams have been found to increase in vividness
toward morning (Shapiro, Goodenough & Gryler, 19^35
Foulkes, 1966). In other words, home dreams are a
highly selected sample. This trend may be further
exaggerated by the fact that vivid, and particularly
unpleasant, dreams often cause us to awaken and, as a
result, are better remembered. Laboratory awakenings,
too, are selective, but on the basis of very different
considerations. Typically, investigators awaken their
subjects within ten minutes or so of the onset of REM
sleep. The purpose of this is to avoid the possibility
of losing an awakening through the sleeper slipping
back into NREM sleep. This relatively early
interruption of periods of REM sleep may be crucial since
delayed REM awakenings have been found to produce more
active, distorted, dramatic, emotional, anxious and
unpleasant reports, with more socially unacceptable
content (violence and hostility) and less voluntary
control than awakenings taken shortly after REM sleep
onset (Foulkes, 1966). Secondly, in the laboratory,
dreams are usually tape-recorded in social interaction
with the experimenter, whereas at home dreams are
written down in privacy. In other words, the recall of
more prosaic dreams in laboratory than home samples
may reflect the selective recall of dream content rather
than the influence of the setting or of being 'wired up'
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on what is dreamt.
In support of these reservations, the one study
that has attempted to match the dream sampling
conditions found little difference between home and
laboratory dreams (Weisz & Foulkes, 1970). Both at
home and wired up in the laboratory, subjects were
woken by an alarm clock at 6.30 a.m. and reported any
dream they recalled in privacy by means of a portable
tape recorder by their bedside. The reports were
rated on the following dimensions: Vivid Fantasy
(unreality, drama and intensity of dream experience);
Hedonic Tone; Active Control (or participation by the
self-character in the dream); Verbal Aggression;
Physical Aggression; and Sexuality. Of these six
scales, only Verbal Aggression was found to discriminate
home from laboratory-collected dreams, home dreams having
the higher proportion of such instances. Weisz & Foulkes
concluded that:
"the raw material of the dream may be
slightly different in the laboratory
than at home" (a reference to the greater
proportion of laboratory dreams incorporating
some aspect of the experimental situation)
"but..,, the 'dream work' is not." (1970» P»
593).
On this evidence, there would seem little justification
for the claim that the laboratory situation serves to
stultify dream experience.
The few laboratory studies of dream recall that
do relate to the repression hypothesis seem, at first
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glance, equivocal in their findings. Evidence for
the repression of dreams comes from studies which
have examined the effects of presleep viewing of
stressful films on subsequent dream recall. If, as
has been suggested (Foulkes & Rechtschaffen, 1964),
this technique charges the mood of subjects' dreams,
then the finding of significant increases in the
incidence of failure to recall dream content from REM
sleep awakenings following the viewing of stressful
dreams (Foulkes, _et al, 1967} Cartwright jet ad, 1969}
Goodenough jet ajL, 1974) may be taken to support dream
repression.
The study by Goodenough and his colleagues ia
particularly revealing. For this study used two groups
of subjects - 'less-differentiated' and 'more-
differentiated' - that have been found to differ in
their characteristic use of defence mechanisms
(Witkin et al, 1962). Less-differentiated individuals
typically use such global defences as denial and
repression, whereas more-differentiated individuals more
often display specialised defences such as isolation
and intellectualisation. This is a distinction in
terms of defensive behaviour very similar to that
hypothesised to exist between convergers and divergers.
Interestingly, the increase in dream recall failures
following the stressful films was restricted to the
limitedly differentiated group, the postulated repressers.
In fact, with the more-differentiated group there was
a slight, but insignificant, increase in dream recall
following the stressful films. Goodenough et_ al
also distinguished two types of recall failures:
wakings eliciting 'forgotten' reports in which the
subject insisted that he had been dreaming yet was
unable to recall any of the specific content; and
wakings eliciting reports of dreamless sleep. The
increase in dream recall failure observed in the less-
differentiated individuals following the stressful
films was found to be entirely attributable to an
increase in the frequency of 'forgotten' reports. Thi
also seems to support the operation of repression on
dreams as, phenomenologically, it is this 'forgotten*
type of report that best fits the action of repression.
However, two earlier studies employing the
technique of presleep stress film viewing (Poullces &
Rechtschaffen, 1964; Karacan ejt al, 1966) found that
this procedure had no effect on dream recall from REM
sleep awakenings.^ It may be that in both these
studies the stress films failed to excite the subjects'
dreams. In one of these studies (Karacan e^t ajl, 1966)
this was actually demonstrated; the stress films were
11 Foulkes & Rechtschaffen (1964) also found no
relation between a test measure of repression and
incidence of dream recall following arousal from REM
sleep.
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found to have no effect on the intensity of feelings
expressed in the dream protocols. In fact this might
have been predicted as the study used a penis gauge12
in all sleep sessions. As its use was likely to have
been extremely stressful, any possible effects of the
stress film would have been overridden. Foulkes &
Rechtschaffen (1964), on the other hand, did find that
the dreams reported following the stressful film were
more vivid than these follottfing a neutral film. This
was somewhat contradicted, however, by the additional
finding that the stressful film did not alter eye
movement profusion during REM sleep - a measure generally
found to reflect the psychological intensity of the
accompanying dreams (Dement & Volpert, 1958; Berger &
Oswald, 1962; Goodenough ejfc al, 1965b; Hobson cjb al
1965; Karacan at al, 1966; Pivik & Foulkes, 1966;
Molinari & Foulkes, 1969; Hauri & van de Castle, 1970;
Takeo, 1970> Goodenough e_t al_, 1974). Moreover, the
'violent' film employed by Foulkes & Rechtschaffen was a
Western which, by present-day standards, would seem quite
unexceptional. It is highly questionable whether the
film would have profoundly disturbed the onlooking
subjects, and, as a result, led to more affectively-
toned dreaming. In this connection, the two adult
studies that found stressful films did affect dream
12 This device is a loop placed over the penis in
order to detect penile erections.
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recall used sexually exciting films (Cartwright ejt al,
1969) and films of a subincision rite and childbirth
(Goodenough et al, 197^)*^ These films seem a better
means of tapping threatening impulses that might be
'worked on' during the subsequent night's dreaming.
Obviously, the question of whether stressful
films do in fact colour dreams is crucial in deciding
whether failure to recall dreams following these films
is attributable to repression. The matter is complicated
by the fact that, even if stressful films do charge the
following night's dreaming with emotion, this effect
would still not necessarily be observed in the reported
dreams. For this is precisely the category of dream on
which repression would operate. More reliable evidence
might be obtained from the physiological indices that have
13 The sexually exciting 'stag movies' included scenes
of foreplay, fellatio, cunnilingus and coitus.
The subincision film was of a rite practised by the
aboriginal group, the Arunta. It shows a number of old
men preparing for the initiation of younger men. All the
men are naked. A number of incision episodes are shown.
Each initiate lies down across the backs of the other
initiates who are perched on all fours close to each
other. An incision is made with a sharp stone along
the ventral surface of the penis and scrotum. The
bleeding penis is then seen being held over a fire.
The faces of the initiates clearly reflect their anguish.
The Birth film was a medical teaching film. The exposed
vagina and thighs of the woman, painted with iodine,
are shown. The arm of the physician is seen inserting
a vacuum extractor into the vagina; the gloved hands
and arms of the obstetrician, covered with blood, are
then shown pulling periodically on a chain protruding
from the vagina. The cutting motion of an episiotomy
is also shown. The baby is then delivered with a gush
of blood. The film is in colour.
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been associated with an intensification of dreaming.
The little data available that bears on this question
is most encouraging. Baekeland et al (1968), using
the subincision film previously mentioned, found that, in
sleep sessions preceded by the stressful film, subjects
displayed both more eye movement activity during REM
sleep and more spontaneous awakenings from REM (but
not NREM) sleep than in sleep sessions preceded by a
neutral film. As both of these variables seem to be
positively related to vividness in the dream
experience, this supports the view that stressful films
do intensify dreaming, which, in turn, strengthens the
case for laboratory repression of dreams.
Austin * 3 Study
The study of dream repression of most direct
relevance to the present investigation is that of Austin
(1971 ), for he also sought verification for the presence
of a repressive orientation in the converger by comparing
the dream recall of convergent and divergent subjects.
Austin found that convergers recalled dreams on only 65$
of awakenings from REM sleep whereas divergers did so
on over 95$ of awakenings (p<.005). On the face of it,
this seems strong support for the view that convergers
react to threatening experiences by repressing while
divergers do not. In addition, on awakenings eliciting
recall, convergers' reports were shorter than those of
divergei*s: the mean number of words used were 58 and 19&
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respectively (p<.005). This too is to be expected if
convergers are repressing substantial amounts of dream
experience.
A closer look at Austin's experimental design
introduces certain reservations, however. Noting the
association of eye movement activity with the vividness
of the reported dream, Austin concerned himself with
taking awakenings, whenever possible, following a burst
of eye movements. As he restricted awakenings to
within 10 and 12 minutes of the onset of REM sleep
(presumably so that the reports elicited were strictly
comparable with respect to length), he occasionally had
to settle for an awakening during REM sleep without eye
movements. However, no attempt was made to introduce
a second category of awakening - one that he could
predict would elicit non-threatening, and therefore non-
repressible, dreams - that might serve as a control
condition. Because of this, these results must be
viewed with some caution. Certainly, it does not seem
strictly necessary to invoke repression in explaining
the differential recall observed. It might equally
be argued that the convergers' poor performance reflects
either a lower incidence of vivid, and therefore
memorable, dreams, or an indifference toxvards them;
theirs may be a personality that accords the 'inner self
little importance.
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Austin dismissed the possibility that convergers
have fewer vivid dreams on the grounds that, in other
research, home 'recallers' and 'non-recallers1 of
dreams had not differed in the profusion of their
rapid eye movements (Lewis e_t al, 1966) - a measure, as
already mentioned, generally found to reflect the
vividness of dreams. These so-called 'non-recallers*
were individuals who claimed they rarely, if ever, dreamt.
Once in the laboratory, however, nearly half of them
became recallers (Lewis ejt a_L, 1966). Clearly, the
question of whether convergers do, in fact, dream less,
or less vividly, requires elucidation. If convergers
can be characterised as less imaginative during the day,
it should not surprise us if they also prove less
imaginative by night.
A further difficulty with Austin's study was that
his convergers and divergers, with one exception, were
drawn from two distinct academic disciplines - engineering
and history respectively. Again, it may be that the
differences in recall reflected a habit or a consciously
adopted difference in attitude or style between
engineers and historians, rather than greater or lesser
degrees of repression. And even if this were not so,
the differences in recall - particularly with respect
to the length of the dream reports - between convergers and
divergers might still be attributed to differences in
verbal fluency between the two groups, since the majority
of convergers were low scorers on the open-ended tests,
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and the divergers high scorers.
Clearly, if the convergers1 postulated
repression of dreams is to be tested rigorously, certain
refinements of Austin's study are required. The groups
of convergers and divergers must be balanced, both in
terms of their academic backgrounds and their verbal
fluency; a conclusion must be reached about the relative
eye movement profusion displayed by the two groups; and,
most of all, a control category of awakening introduced.
For it is not enough merely to show that convergers are
poor at recalling dream experiences that may be
threatening; it must also be demonstrated that they are
not equally poor at recalling non-threatening dream
experience.
Fortunately, further developments in the electro¬
physiological study of sleep have suggested just such a
control awakening.
REM Sleep - An Internal Distinction
The physiological model generated by the
Aserinsky-Kleitman findings made a qualitative distinction
between the properties of REM sleep and those of NREM sleep.
More recently, a distinction has been made within REM
sleep itself. Moruzzi (1963) pointed out that some of the
14 This is not an inevitable consequence as convergence
and divergence are measures of bias toward one or other of
the two types of test.
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physiological features of REM sleep are 'tonic* - that
is they extend more or less continuously throughout what
had previously been considered to be a unitary 'period*
of REM sleep. These include, for example, the low-
voltage mixed frequency EEG tracing and the mental and
submental EMG suppression. In contrast, other features
of REM sleep, most notably the rapid eye movements
themselves, are 'phasic' - that is they occur only
15
intermittently during REM sleep. In substantiation of
this physiologically-based distinction, other research
has demonstrated the neuroanatomical independence of
tonic and phasic features of REM sleep (Jouvet, 1967;
Pompeiano, 1967).
It is apparent, then, that a physiological model
which makes a qualitative distinction between REM and
NREM sleep, but none within periods of REM sleep, is no
longer adequate. Specifically, the tonic-phasic model
provides a means of recognising important variations
within REM sleep and the similarities as well as the
differences between REM and NREM sleep.
15 Bursts of eye movement activity within REM sleep
have been found to correlate temporally with a number of
other physiological changes such as pontine-geniculate-
occipital 'spiking' in the EEG (Pompeiano, 1967)»
pupillary dilation (Berluchi & Strata, 1965)»
electrodermal responses (Broughton e_t ad, 1965) a
shallowing of respiration (Aserinsky, 1967)* and augmented
EMG suppressions (Pompeiano, 1967) but with increased fine
muscle activity (Baldridge, Whitman & Kramer, 1965).
59
What are the implications of this tonic-
phasic model for mental activity during REM sleep? In
the past, psychological differences within REM sleep
have tended to be played down in the interests of
highlighting and maintaining the REM/NREM sleep
dichotomy. Nevertheless, a number of studies have
reported correspondences between mental content and
associated eye movement activity during REM sleep,
although usually of a less specific nature than that
suggested by the scanning hypothesis. Periods of REM
sleep with profuse eye movement activity have yielded
dreams that have been variously described as more active,
vivid, intense, emotional and anxiety-provoking than REM
sleep characterised by few eye movements (Dement & Wolpert,
1958; Berger & Oswald, 1962; Goodenough et_ al 1965b;
Hobson £t_ al_, 1965; Pivik & Foulkes, 1966; Karacan _et_ al_
1966; Hauri & van de Castle, 1970; Takeo, 1970;
Goodenough e_t al, 197*0 •
If, as these studies suggest, different kinds of
dream experience are associated with physiological
variations within REM sleep, then this stage of sleep
may not be a homogeneous psychological entity any more
than a physiological one. Aserinsky (1967)1 noting the
correlation of a number of non-visual physiological
parameters with bursts of eye movement activity,
suggested that episodes of ocular activity and those of
ocular quiescence must be differentiated in more general
6 0
phenomenal terms than those specified by the scanning
hypothesis. He speculated that the different types
of intra-REM sleep episode, might be related to different
•levels' of dreaming, specifically suggesting that
episodes of ocular quiescence might be associated with
the more thoughtlike experience typical of NREM sleep.
Much as the tonic-phasic model does - only this time at
a psychological level of discourse - this viewpoint
focuses attention on phasic-related events within REM
sleep as being responsible for what was previously
regarded as the distinctive aspects of REM sleep 'periods1.
Following up Aserinsky's speculation experimentally,
Molinari & Foulkes (1969) collected reports from ocularly
quiescent (REM-Q) and ocularly active (REM-M) episodes of
REM sleep, as well as from NREM sleep, with instructions
to report the very last preawakening experience. The
investigators grouped the reports into two categories:
those containing some evidence of 'secondary cognitive
elaboration' (SCE), with or without visual imagery; and
those visual reports containing no evidence of secondary
elaboration, labelled 'primary visual experience' (PVE).
These classifications were arrived at both deductively
and inductively, and the criteria for scoring a report as
SCE is fully described in Chapter h. Most of the criteria
were drawn from earlier studies of the quality of NREM-
related experience but some of the subcategories of
conceptual activity were included post hoc if they
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discriminated REM-M from REM-Q reports. Nevertheless,
subsequent 'blind' judging proved reliable and Molinari &
Foulkes found that 80$ of the reports collected from
REM-Q and 77$ of the reports collected from NREM
awakenings were classified as SCE, the remainder being
classified residually as PVE. With reports collected
from REM-M awakenings, in contrast, only 12$ were
classified as SCE and 88$ as PVE.
In other words, dream experiences predominating
during REM-Q episodes contained either visual imagery
along with active cognitive processes which elaborate,
interpret, or in some way reflect on this imagery, or
purely cognitive processes in the absence of any visual
imagery. REM-M episodes, on the other hand, were
associated with visual imagery but without any cognitive
elaboration of these events.
PVE and SCE and Mechanisms of Defence
In essence, the SCE/PVE distinction made by
Molinari & Foulkes rests on the presence or absence of
intellectual activity in the dream report. Freud {*[91+9)
claimed that intellectual elements of the manifest dream
are not the product of the dream-work. Where intellectual
activity does manifest itself in the dream, it can be
attributed to either of two sources. It may be the
16 Clearly, these categories must be viewed with some
caution until cross-validated.
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result of dream-thoughts arriving unaltered at the
manifest level. Such audacity suggests that these
are dream-thoughts that are not threatening. They
are latent because of their unattended rather than
repressed status: their preconscious rather than
unconscious origin. An alternative source of
intellectual activity, and one of particular interest
here, is secondary revision, making its appearance after
the dream has entered consciousness. In other words,
the presence of intellectual activity in the dream
experience suggests either that the dream is not
threatening, or, at least, that it has been rendered less
so by revision.
If this is the case, then the expression of our
threatening 'wishes' is the preserve of REM-M-related
17PVE. ' This view draws support from the 'frustration'
effects and the reduction of 'ego control' observed in
some human subjects selectively deprived of their REM
sleep requirement (Dement, 1960; Sampson, 1966; Clemes
17 In this connection, striking drive-oriented behaviour
has been observed in cats when phasic events, normally
occurring during REM-M sleep, were discharged while awake
(following treatment with para-chlorophenylalanine; Dement,
1969). The cats developed an impressive repertoire - rage,
hypex"sexuality and hyperphagia - as well as a 'general
personality change'. The sexual behaviour, in particular,
transcended any semblance of normality:
".... we have seen previously indifferent
male cats compulsively mount not only
anaesthetised male cats and passive male
cats, but relentlessly stalk a raging,
clawing, highly resistant torn and persevere
until the quarry is finally backed into a
corner where a mount can be executed."
(Dement, 1969> p. 2p6).
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& Dement, 1967; Agnew et al« 1967; Greenberg et al.
1970) - always assuming that what is critical in REM
sleep deprivation is the loss of phasic events (for
which there is considerable evidence; Dement, 1969)* and
18
hence of PVE. Whether drive expression is in fact
prominent in PVE is not clear from Molinari & Foulkes'
study, since the classification they employed was based
on the form rather than the substance of mental activity.
Certainly, the formal characteristics of PVE, as
described by Molinari & Foulkes, appear consonant with
such an hypothesis:
"Topographically, PVE bears the stamp of
an eruption from the unconscious;
structurally, PVE appears to be an
intrusion which is ego-alien." (1969* p. 362).
If PVE does indeed harbour hedonistic, normally
unconscious impulses, it is presumably this type of
experience that brings the convergerfe tendency to repress
into play. And if SCE is at best an additional distortion
18 The findings of these REM sleep deprivation studies
are notoriously difficult to interpret. Firstly, it is
not possible to deprive subjects of large amounts of REM
sleep without also seriously disrupting their NREM sleep;
in which case, the effects observed may merely reflect
general sleep deprivation rather than the deprivation
of REM sleep per se. Secondly, REM sleep deprivation
involves the deprivation of biological events as well
as dreaming: in other words, the psychological effects
observed may be a consequence ('spin off') of biological
changes. To further complicate matters, there is
evidence to suggest that some individuals can 'displace'
intense dreaming into NREM sleep (Cartwright et_ ad, 1967;
Pivik & Foulkes, 1968) along with the phasic physiological
features (Pivik _et al, 1969).
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of these impulses in the interests of defence_ and
providing the link forged between eye movement activity
and dream experience holds - then the contrast between
REM-M and REM-Q awakenings offers us a crucial test
of the repression hypothesis. On the assumption that
REM-M awakenings do interrupt threatening dreams, should
convergers prove poorer than divergers at recalling dream
content following REM-M awakenings only, this would
support active repression: if, on the other hand, convergers
perform equally badly on both types of awakening, this
would favour an alternative, more passive, mode of
forgetting. In other words, we are introducing a control
category of awakening (REM-Q) within REM sleep, with which
to test the repression hypothesis. This is important
as .it circumvents the possible criticism that any
difference found in recall of dreams between the awakening
conditions might be a function of different levels of
arousal (as measured by the EEG tracings) such as exist
between REM and NREM sleep. In addition, restricting
the report to the very las t preawakening experience
increases the likelihood of finding differences in
incidence of recall that may be attributed to repression.
19 There is some support for this idea that SCE reports
are in an acceptable form whereas PVE ones are not from the
results of Molinari & Foulkes: REM-Q awakenings elicited
100$ recall; REM-M awakenings elicited 80$ recall. The
amount of hypothesised repression is relatively small,
but the subjects were selected on the basis of their
sensitivity and 'openness to experience', one of the
criteria for which was good recall of dreams.
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For if this restriction was not imposed, subjects
might well remember some earlier experience that would
qualify the awakening as one eliciting some specific
content even where substantial repression may have taken
place.
As has already been pointed out, Freud saw his
secondary revision as acting on a previous or ongoing
dream experience in the interests of defence. And, in
view of their description, it is likely that much of
Molinari & Foulkes* SCE is akin to secondary revision.
Therefore, if the diverger is more prone to
intellectualisation, this defensive strategy might be
reflected in his spending proportionately more time in
SCE than the converger. The converger, conversely,
may require less SCE to complete his defences against
what he has, or so the hypothesis runs, substantially
repressed. If this is so, and if once again the link
between SCE and REM sleep without eye movements is
confirmed, then divergers should spend a greater
proportion of REM sleep than do convergers in REM-Q (as
opposed to REM-M) activity. Moreover, as the periods
of REM sleep during the latter part of the night1s sleep
give the more affectively-charged dream reports (Foulkes,
1966), this effect should be most marked in these later
periods of REM sleep as these presumably require more
defensive effort from the dreamer.
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Clearly, the suggestion that intellectual
strategies of defence will be reflected in the
patterning of eye movement activity within REM sleep
is highly speculative. As far as I am aware, this
suggestion has not been entertained, far less investigated,
elsewhere. Nevertheless, a few threads of evidence do
exist that, twisted together, provide support. More-
differentiated individuals - who tend to adopt
intellectualisation in defence - have been found not only
to have less profuse eye movement activity during REM
sleep (Lewis ejb aJL, 1966) but also to spend more time in
REM sleep (Cartwright, 1966) than less-differentiated
individuals. Similarly, home recallers of dreams have
less profuse eye movement activity while spending more
time in REM sleep than home non-recallers of dreams
(Antrobus ejt al, 1964). In other words, in both absolute
and proportionate terms, more-differentiated individuals
and home recallers of dreams spend more time in REM sleep
devoid of eye movement activity. Substituting 'diverger*
and •converger' for, respectively, 'more' or •less-
differentiated1 individual - far less 'home recaller' and
•non-recaller• of dreams - is, of course, fraught with
19danger. p Yet at least we have some evidence that two
groups, selected on psychological considerations, can differ
systematically with respect to their eye movement discharge.
19 Nevertheless, if divergers do spend a greater amount
of time than convergers in episodes of REM sleep associated
with elaborative activity, this might \>rell contribute to
their lengthier dream reports (Austin, 1971)•
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Finally, one further possibility, not unconnected
with the other hypotheses, seems worthy of consideration.
It is possible that convergers, in compensation for their
supposed repressed daytime existence, are particularly
prone to express libidinous drives in their dreams. This
hypothesis leans heavily on the psychodynamic notion that
we have common psychic drives which must find expression
in one way or another; psychic equilibrium must be
maintained. According to this reasoning, an
unimaginative, drive-repressing day existence might be
compensated by a highly-coloured, drive-expressing night
20
life. Hudson has implied just such a compensatory power
on the part of the converger*s unconscious:
"
• • • • presumably defences are not rigid
for rigidity*s sake; they are rigid
precisely because the irrational impulses
they stem back are unusually potent."
(1966, p. 97).
As more intense dream experiences have been
associated with those periods of REM sleep characterised
by frequent eye movements, such a compensation effect
20 There is some evidence in support of the idea that
dreams express drives that do not find an outlet by day.
Swanson & Foulkes (1967) found an inverse relationship
between manifest dream sexuality and waking desire; and
Robbins and Tanck (1969) found less aggression in dreams
following a period of extensive community violence.
Also, if repressive individuals do indeed compensate
during dreaming, they should prove less tolerant of REM
sleep deprivation. There is some support for this:
less-differentiated subjects proved less capable than
more-differentiated ones of delaying fantasy gratification
without experiencing ill effects (Cartwright ejb al, 1967).
Moreover, 'repressers* react to REM sleep deprivation with
more intense dream experience and eye movement profusion
subsequently, whereas 'sensitizers* do not (Pivik &
Foulkes, 1966).
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might -well result in convergers displaying a greater
p -1
profusion of eye movements during REM sleep. In
addition, convergers may display a greater need to dream
than divergers, expressed in some sort of *immediacy'
22
effect, such as a shorter REM latency , and longer periods
of REM sleep early in the night.
21 In one respect, the compensation and intellectualisation
hypotheses clash, as both predict more profuse eye movement
activity in the converger. A closer analysis of the eye
movement activity will have to be undertaken if we are to
discriminate between the two effects.
22 The interval between falling asleep and the first





In selecting subjects from a similar population,
Austin (1971) relied on a method of advertising for students
and screening volunteers individually on the tests
discriminating convergers and divergers. Subjects were
then judged convergent or divergent on the basis of the
test norms of English schoolboys (Hudson, 1966). There
seem several drawbacks in adopting this procedure.
Firstly, relying on volunteers is less likely to provide
a representative population from -which to draw extremes.
Indeed, there are some grounds for supposing that convergers
1
are by nature non-volunteers. Secondly, testing subjects
1 In a recent study, Margaret Cormack and I asked a group
of some 200 biology students to attend a testing session
(convergent/divergent tests). Students were provided with
a number of alternative times and asked to choose a
suitable one. Of this group, about 50$ turned up at first
asking. This sub-group of responders produced a skewed
curve towards the divergent end of the spectrum (among
males, there were no extreme convergers but 5 extreme
divergers). Subsequently, the remaining individuals were
provided with further times and, if this failed, they were
sent letters and/or telephoned and offered yet another time.
Eventually, over 80$ of the original group completed the
convergent/divergent tests. The skewness became
progressively less marked with successive testings but,
even at the end there was not one extreme converger (in
terms of previously collected student samples). It is
possible, of course, that there were no extreme convergers
in this particular group. Subsequently, from the group
tested, a number of convergers and divergers were asked to
attend an interview, the purpose of which was to ask them
to keep a dream diary. Again, male convergers in
particular were much less likely to attend than their
divergent counterparts.
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individually is likely to increase the variability of
the test conditions which, in turn, may affect test
performance. It has been shown, for example, that
changes in the presentation of open-ended tests can
produce quite radical differences in test response
(Hudson, 1968). Finally, Austin took norms obtained
from group tests on English schoolboys and applied them
to scores obtained from university students tested on
an individual basis. Equating scores gathered from
group and individual testing sessions, and those from
schoolboys (albeit prospective university candidates
for the most part) with university students' scores
2
would both seem dangerous practices. With this in
mind, the earlier method used by Hudson (1966) was
substituted: by testing whole groups, a representative
population of scores was obtained from which extremes
in bias were then drawn. One of the reasons Austin
shied away from this method, presumably, was the
practical difficulty encountered with students.
Certainly, this approach is more difficult to carry out
successfully with students than with a captive audience
of schoolboys. Nevertheless, the advantages would seem
to heavily outweigh the disadvantages.
2 English and Scottish schooling may also make a
difference, the university students (at Edinburgh)
coming mostly from Scottish schools.
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Initially, 3 groups of students specialising
in engineering, fine arts and architecture were
screened. With the engineering and fine arts groups,
whole years were addressed at the end of one of thoir
formal lectures and asked if they would be willing to
spend approximately one hour at a mutually convenient
time in completing some pencil-and-paper tests. On
both occasions, the experimenter was introduced by the
respective lecturers. The experimenter explained,
briefly, that certain individuals who completed the
test would subsequently be asked to participate in an
experiment on sleep and dreaming that would involve
spending several nights in a sleep laboratory. For
participation in this experiment, subjects would receive
£10, with the added inducement of free breakfast on the
nights spent in the sleep laboratory. It was stressed
that the experiment would in no way interfere with the
normal academic life of the individual. Subjects would
merely spend usual sleeping hours in the laboratory and
be up in time for the earliest of lectures. It was
also stressed that, even if subjects were not interested
in the experiment itself, they should still complete the
initial tests as this would provide the experimenter
with a more representative population of scores on which
to draw. Individuals could, if they wished, indicate
on the test sheets that they did not wish to participate
further in the experiment. A subsequent time was
arranged for the test administration which, for both groups,
was immediately following a prescribed lecture one week
later.
On the test administration sessions, the
experimenter entered the room as the lecture finished
and reminded the group of the session. The response
rate could not be ascertained precisely since some of
the individuals who were present at the introductory
session may not have been present on the second occasion
and some of those present on the second occasion may
not have been present initially and, as a result, may
have had other commitments. Of those who were present
just prior to the test administration, an estimated 75$
of engineers and 80$ of artists stayed to do the tests.
While the response rate in either case was not high
enough to ensure a totally representative population, it
was probably as high as could be achieved in the
3
circumstances.
The procedure adopted for screening the group of
architecture students and, subsequently, a second group
2*
of engineers differed in certain important respects.
3 There may, of course, be something particular about
students who do not attend lectures.
4 A second group of engineers was screened owing to
difficulties encountered with the divergent engineers
originally selected. Although the original group of
engineers produced the requisite number (2) of divergers
both had to be dropped: one owing to an outbreak of
psoriasis apparently incurred as a result of attaching
electrodes to the scalp during the course of the
experimentj the other for repeatedly failing to turn up
at the laboratory.
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On these occasions, the experimenter obtained permission
to use a time normally set aside for a lecture.
Students turned up quite unaware that they would be asked
to complete tests in place of the lecture. As before,
the respective lecturers introduced the experimenter who
then made the same introductory remarks. On both these
occasions, response was 100$.
The fine art and architecture groups contained
both male and female students; the engineering groups
only male students. All students were tested, if willing,
although female test scores were subsequently discarded
for the purposes of the present investigation. In
addition, all test scores from males who were not native
English speakers or who had not been brought up and
educated in Britain were also discarded.
Before commencing each testing session, subjects
were assured that all responses would be treated
confidentially and that no completed tests would be
released on any pretext to their department or the
University generally. The following tests were
administered: the intelligence test, AH5. Parts 1 and 11:
the open-ended tests, 'Meanings of Words' and 'Uses of
Objects'. (See Appendix 1); and the Eysenck Personality
Inventory. The intelligence test was given first
and the standard presentation, described in the accompanying
manual, was followed. After the forty minutes allowed
lh
for the intelligence test, subjects were introduced to
the open-ended tests with "And now, as Monty Python
would have it, for something completely different".
It was hoped, in this way, to lighten the general
atmosphere created by the intelligence test and also
offer a clue that the open-ended tests could be
approached in a different manner, without necessarily
encouraging individuals to be flippant. It was also
mentioned that there was no restriction on responses,
nor a time limit. No further instructions were given
other than those appearing on the tests - to give as
many different meanings of words, or uses of objects, as
came to mind. The intention of the above instructions
was to give to those who wanted it carte blanche to
respond without reservation, while at the same time
avoiding defining the situation as one requiring divergent
responsiveness as even the most intractable of minds
can be coerced into open-ended productivity (Hudson, 1968).
The testing procedure, therefore, was seen as one
maximising possible differences in open-ended test
performance.
An BysenckPersonality Inventory was also given out
along with the open-ended tests and subjects were asked to
complete this according to the instructions 011 the
Questionnaire, after finishing the open-ended tests. As
no time limit was imposed, and subjects were free to go
when they had finished, the UPI served the important
function of •buffer1. In addition, it provided
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extraversion and neuroticism scores, both, of which might
influence dream recall. Allowing subjects to go when
they had finished seemed preferable to making them all
wait for the slowest members of the group, since the
knowledge that they were holding up others might
influence these slower subjects to abandon prematurely
their open-ended tests.






Combined 102 38.0 6.8 23-60 16.4 3.6 7-29 21.5 7.9 5-58
Table 3.1 presents the raw scores for the different
groups on each of the thinking tests: on the AH5. the group
of art students performed markedly poorer than the other 3
groups; on the first of the open-ended tests, 'Meanings
of Words1, there was little to choose between any of the
groups; and on the 'Uses of Objects' test, the fine arts
and architecture groups produced about 50$ more
distinguishable uses, on average, than either group of
engineers. Taken together, these results complement
earlier work suggesting that arts students are more likely




















performance, whereas students of the physical sciences
are more likely to display the opposite trend, a
relatively high I.Q. coupled with a low open-ended test
performance (Hudson, 1966). Architects, interestingly,
rather than occupying an intermediary position, performed
well on both I.Q. and open-ended tests, combining the
skills of engineer and artist.
The use of 2 groups of engineers provided the
opportunity of comparing the two sampling procedures
employed. The groups of engineers were drawn from
consecutive years specialising in electrical engineering
and both were tested during the third year of their course.
Differences in group performance on each of the three
tests were slight, certainly not sufficient to suggest
that the original group, despite the lower response rate,
was a less representative sample. It is time that the
second group of engineers did produce a range of scores
on the 'Uses of Objects' test far exceeding that of the
original group. However, this was entirely the result
of a single score of 51> the second highest score in
this second group being 27•
Individual raw scores on each of the throe tests
\tfere graded A, B, C, D or E in the respective proportions
1:2:4:2:1. The grades of the two open-ended tests were
then averaged to provide a composite open-ended grade.
This was then contrasted with the grade obtained by the
individual on the Intelligence Test, yielding a differential
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ranging from +4 (i.Q. grade A and open-ended composite
grade E) to -4 (i.Q. grade E and open-ended composite grade
A). Finally, these differential scores were once again
proportioned out, as far as the bunching of scores
allowed, into 1:2:4:2:1 and classified accordingly along
the convergent/divergent dimension.
In practice, this produced the following:
TABLE 3.2: DISTRIBUTION OF CONVERGENT/DIVERGENT
BIAS IN THE WHOLE SAMPLE
Differential Score $ of Sample Status on Converger/
Diverger Dimension
+2.0 or over 11$ extreme converger
+1.5 and +1.0 18$ moderate converger
+0.5, 0 and -0.5 51$ •all-rounder'
-1.0 and -1.5 12$ moderate diverger
-2.0 or over 9$ extreme diverger
Separating the academic disciplines gave:
TABLE 3.3: DISTRIBUTION OF CONVERGENCE/DIVERGENCE
BY ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE
Fine Architecture Engineering Engine ering
Arts 1 2
N £ N £ N £ N £
Extr. cons. 0 oj 2 8) 4 14] 5 14)
117 )27 >39 )28
Mod. cons. 2 17! 5 19) 7 25! 5 14)
'All-rounders' 1 8 16 62 13 47 21 58
Mod. dis. 3 25] 1 41 2 7] 5 14)I75 )12 114 )14
Extr. dis. 6 50) 2 8) 2 r\ 0 0)
Again, as Hudson {^^66) has previously found,
students of the arts are more likely to be divergent
and students of the physical sciences convergent in
bias. The sample of male art students is small
(n=12) and the highly skewed distribution of bias
in this group may be atypical. Nevertheless, the
finding that 6 of the 12 members of this group were
extreme divergers does suggest that they are quite
distinct in this respect. Rather surprisingly, this
small group of art students also produced 2 convergers.
The architecture students, on this occasion, present a
profile very similar to that of the engineers, and not
at all like that of the artists. And, once again, a
comparison of both groups of engineers reveals nothing
to suggest that the two screening procedures led to
differences in sampling.
Two convergers and 2 divergers were then selected
5
from each of the 3 academic disciplines. As a
consequence of also attempting to match convergers and
divergers with respect to their open-ended scores,
those selected were not necessarily the most extreme
in their respective disciplines.
5 As well as matching the convergent and divergent
groups on academic discipline, this selection procedure
also allows us to look at the question of academic
•misfits' - in this case, convergent fine arts students
and divergent architecture and engineering students
(see Table 3,3).
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TABLE 3.4: SUBJECTS SELECTED FOR THE LABORATORY EXPERIMENT
Academic Convergence/ I .Q. Grade Open-Ended
Discipline Divergence Grade
Architec ture extreme converger +2.0 0.0
extreme converger + 1 .0 -1.0
extreme diverger -1.0 + 1.0
extreme diverger 0.0 +2.0
Fine Arts moderate converger + 1 .0 -0.5
moderate converger 0.0 -1.0
moderate diverger -2.0 -0.5
extreme diverger -2.0 0.0
Engineering extreme converger +2.0 0.0
moderate converger +2.0 +0.5
moderate diverger -2.0 -1.0
moderate diverger -1 .0 +0.5
In both the fine arts and engineering groups, it
proved possible to select convergers and divergers who
were comparable in respect of their open-ended test
performance. With the architecture students,
t
however,
this was not possible. There were only 3 divergers in
this group, and they all had open-ended grades that none
of the con.orgers could hope to match. In other words,
6 convergers and 4 divergers fell within an averaged index
of open-ended test performance ranging from -1.0 to +0.5*
6 When this was discovered, a second group of architecture
students was screened. However, this group was found,
subsequently, to have met the open-ended tests before, and
this was reflected in an altogether higher open-ended test
performance. As a result, none of this group were used.
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TABLE 3.3: OPEN-ENDED TEST GRADES OF SELECTED
CONVERGERS AND DIVERGERS
Composite Open-Ended Grade
-1.0 -0.5 O.o +0.5 +1.0 +2.0
Convergers 2 1 2 1
Divergers 111111
This attempt to match selected convergers and
divergers on open-ended test performance inevitably
resulted in a marked difference between the groups on the
intelligence test: convergers, M=45»7} divergers, M=29.8.
If 'intelligence', as measured by the AII5. affects dream
recall, it would presumably be in uhe opposite direction
7
to the one hypothesised in this study, although, at this
general level of intelligence, differences are unlikely to
be a significant factor.
Finally, on the Lysenck Personality Inventory,
both convergers and divergers selected had the high
neuroticism scores typical of students (m=26.2 and 25.7
respectively). With respect to extraversion scores,
the groups were also quite closely matched: convergers,
M=20.2; divergers, M=23.5«
7 Schonbar (1959) reported a positive relationship




Prior to the experiment, 18 potentially suitable
subjects - 6 from each academic discipline - were
interviewed. The experimenter explained the procedure
involved:
"The experiment involves spending 8 non-consecutive nights
in a sleep laboratory housed in the Royal Edinburgh Hospital.
On your first right you would be collected and taken there.
On each subsequent night you would come to the laboratory
at 10.00 p.m. After getting ready for bed, a number of
electrodes would be attached to your face and head for the
purpose of recording potential differences between any two
given points (the electrode placements were then
demonstrated). These potential differences are translated
by an EEG machine into tracings from which we are able to
distinguish several stages or 'depths' of sleep. The
purpose of the experiment is to study possible differences
in mental content experienced during these different stages
of sleep. On the first 4 nights you would be allowed to
sleep undisturbed. These nights provide you with the
opportunity to acclimatise yourselves to the sleeping
situation and, for my part, the opportunity to determine
your normal sleeping patterns, for individuals may differ
in thi3 respect. On the remaining 4 nights, you would be
woken from different stages of sleep and asked to report
any mental experience that may have been passing through
your mind just prior to arousal. It is very uhlikply that
you would be woken more than 4 times on any one of these
nights. Each morning you would be raised about 7»30 a.m.,
given a cooked breakfast, and, usually, driven back to the
university before 9.00 a.m. In addition, as alcohol and
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drugs affect sleep patterns and, possibly, also mental
content, if you do participate in the experiment you
will have to agree to take no alcohol or medicines from
at least 72 hours before your first laboratory session
until the completion of the experiment. The 8 nights
will be spread over approximately 3 to 4 weeks. You
would be paid £10. Any questions?".
After clearing up any points raised, interviewees
were then asked if they were willing to participate.
All indicated that they were willing. Potential
subjects were then asked various questions about their
sleeping habits. The following were all grounds for
exclusion from the experiment: a normal sleeping time of
less than 6 hours or more than 9 hours; difficulty
experienced in falling asleep after going to bed;
difficulty in sleeping in a strange place; difficulty
in getting to sleep again if woken in the middle of the
night; regular 'naps' taken during the course of the
day; being in the habit of taking something to aid sleep
(beverages, such as 'Horlicks', as well as sleeping pills);
and an unwillingness to report in detail dreams experienced,
including those of a personal nature. In px-actice, these
criteria excluded only 2 subjects: one a convergent
architect who claimed to habitually sleep no more than 4
to 5 hours a night; the other, a divergent artist who
found difficulty both in sleeping in a strange place and
in returning to sleep if aroused in the middle of the night.
This divergent subject also frequently slept for 10 hours
or more when permitted. Most of these criteria are
self-explanatory. One reason for avoiding 'long' and
•short* sleepers was the difficulty in comparing their
sleep patterns. More important, short sleepers would
presumably have fewer periods of REM sleep and thus
providd fewer awakening opportunities; and long sleepers
might be sleep-deprived as the laboratory design only
allowed, at the most, nine hours in bed, and this
deprivation might modify these individuals' normal sleep
patterns.
Twelve of the remaining 16 subjects were then
selected for the laboratory experiment on the basis of
their convergent/divergent bias, their academic discipline
and their open-ended test performance, as described in
Chapter 3, As already mentioned, both divergent
engineering students originally selected had to be dropped
Subsequently, 3 divergers from a second group of
engineering students were interviewed and 2 selected on
the same basis as before.
Subjects were contacted about 2 weeks before their
first laboratory session, given each of the 8 dates they
had been allocated, and arrangements made to collect them
on their first night. Subjects were also reminded not
to take any alcohol or drugs within J2 hours of their
first session, and also asked to refrain from taking 'naps
on days when they came to the laboratory.
8b
On arrival, subjects were shown round the
laboratory and particularly the EEG machine and then
taken to their sleeping accommodation. Subjects were
then asked to get ready for bed and to take particular
care in washing their faces as any grease was a
potential source of interference on the recordings.
Once ready for bed, subjects returned to the
laboratory to have the electrodes attached. Each
electrode attachment point on the face and head was
thoroughly cleaned using spirit and the electrodes
securely attached.^ Six channels were used for each
subject: 2 electrooculographic (EOG), 2 electroencephalo-
graphic (EEG), and 2 electromyographic (EMG). Using 2
channels for each electrophysiological variable lessened
the chance of losing one of the variables through a
faulty electrode connection developing during the course
2
of the night.
Subjects were expected to arrive at the laboratory
by 10.00 p.m. and %irere usually in bed by 11.00 p.m. at
the latest. With one exception, all 12 subjects spent 8
non-consecutive nights in the laboratory. One subject
spent only 7 nights in the laboratory, having missed his
1 The electrode attachment points are illustrated in the
figure in Appendix 11.
2 The procedure for rectifying interference is fully
described in Appendix 11.
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third, night through illness. The first 2 nights
were adaptation ones, allowing the subjects to become
acclimatised to sleeping in the laboratory with
electrodes attached. Measurable adaptation effects
are usually sem on the first night's recordings only
(Rechtschaffen & Verdone, 1964), but a second night
provided a safety margin. Nights 3 and 4 were also
spent in undisturbed sleep. These 2 nights provided
the baseline tracings from which the duration and
patterning of REM sleep was determined. On the
remaining 4 nights, subjects were awakened and their
dream recall tested. It was intended to use the first
of these waiting nights as an adaptation one as a previous
study (Firth, 197^) had demonstrated a markedly lower
recall rate on the first waking night. This was not
found in the present study, however, and recall data from
all 4 waiting nights have been included in the results.
Two subjects - 1 converger and 1 diverger - were
run on each experimental night, with each subject always
having the same partner. In this way, and as far as was
possible, any variations that may have occurred from night
to night were experienced equally by the convergent and
divergent groups. Usually, but always on waiting nights,
subjects slept in separate rooms adjacent to the
laboratory.
On each night subjects came to the laboratory,
they were asked if they had consumed any alcohol or drugs
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of any sort since their last session. In addition
to serving as a check, this reinforced the prohibition
for subsequent occasions. On undisturbed nights, no
special instructions were given and subjects were just
encouraged to have a good night's sleep. On waking
nights and prior to retiring, subjects were familiarised
with the intercommunication system, the signal used to
wake them, and the subsequent enquiry procedure. Two
points in this enquiry were particularly stressed:
firstly, the need to concentrate on the very last
preawakening experience to the exclusion of all else;
secondly, to report any mental content, no matter how
trivial, from this last sequence.
On these waking nights, subjects were aroused
in each period of REM sleep from the third of the night
onwards. Two types of awakening were taken: REM-M
awakenings, taken immediately following or during a
burst of eye movements; and REM-Q awakenings, taken
after at least 30 seconds of REM sleep without an eye
3
movement." On account of the greater difficulty
associated with obtaining a REM-Q awakening, this type
of awakening was sought between 5 and 10 minutes after
the onset of REM sleep; and if it could not be made,
a REM-M awakening was taken instead. Even so, there
3 Examples of electrophysiological tracings preceding
REM-M and REM-Q awakenings are presented in Appendix
111.
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were nearly twice as many REM-M awakenings taken:
with convergers, 36 REII-M and 20 REM-Q awakenings;
with divergers, 40 REM-M and 2b REM-Q awakenings. The
auditory awakening signal employed was sufficiently loud
to ensure abrupt arousal since more gradual awakening
results in an increase in the incidence of 'thinking1
reports (e.g., Shapiro at al, 1965)• On arousal, a
standardised interview procedure was conducted by the
experimenter from the laboratory through the inter¬
communication system and taped. The experimenter asked,
"Can you tell me the very last thing that was passing
through your mind just before X woke you?" To preserve
the spontaneity of the response, further interrogation
was restricted to an encouraging "Go on" or "Any more
4
details?". Where necessary - for example to clarify
a lengthy sequence or to steer a subject away from
elaborating an earlier sequence - the experimenter re-
aslced "What was the very last thing?". Subjects were
then simply asked whether there had been any visual
imagery present. Finally, in wakings eliciting no
recall, and where the information was not offered
spontaneously, subjects were asked if they thought they
had been experiencing anything just before waking.
b Responses to clarifying questions might be classified
as 'cognitive elaboration' (SCE) and, hence, conceal any
possible distinction on the PVE/SCE dichotomy between
REM-M and REM-Q awakenings.
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The method of data collection adopted in the
present study differed from that of Molinari & Foulkes
(1969). Presumably to avoid possible contaminating
experimenter effects, Molinari & Foulkes adopted a self-
administering interview technique in which subjects were
required, following arousal, to respond to a written
questionnaire that was to hand. However, this technique
necessitated switching on a light in the subjects' rooms.
Sudden illumination might well lead to a loss of reverie;
it therefore seemed appropriate to avoid this in a study,
such as the present one, dependent on a measure of
incidence of recall.
Data Analysis
Working in ignorance of associated reports of
5
mental content, one judge re-examined all preawakening
polygraph tracings to check whether each awakening should
be classified as REM-Q or REM-M. Only those awakenings
preceded by at least 30 seconds of REM sleep uninterrupted
by any eye movements were classified as REM-Q. As a
result of this reappraisal, 2 REM-Q awakenings were
excluded. In one of these cases, a solitary eye
movement intervened just prior to arousal. This was
regarded as meeting the criteria of neither category of
awakening and was eliminated altogether. In the second
case, a burst of eye movements immediately preceded arousal,
5 Mark Austin.
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and this awakening was reclassified REM-M. Presumably,
both these instances of eye movement activity occurred during
the brief, but inevitable, lapse of time between the
experimenter deciding to arouse the subject and actually
doing so.
g
Two judges , working from typed manuscripts in
which reports were ordered by subject and night, were asked
to categorise each report as SCE or, residually, PVE, using
the following criteria (after Molinari & Foulkes):
Secondary Cognitive Elaboration (SCE) is defined in terms
of three broad categories, not mutually exclusive, and
each containing two or more subcategories. Category A
includes reports with evidence of active intellectual
processes within the experience, such as thinking, being
aware, recognising or interpreting. Subcategories are:
(l) purely conceptual reports, defined as any experience
lacking in visual imagery; (2) reports containing
visual imagery plus some evidence of a thinking process
whether related to the imagery or not; (3) awareness of
one's mental processes as an object of consciousness (e.g.,
"I knew I was wondering about...."); (4) perceptual
recognition or interpretation (e.g., "I was trying to place
it, it seemed familiar"). Category B includes reports
containing conceptual relationships, alternatives or
comparisons. Subcategories are: (l) two apparently
parallel thoughts or dream events seen in some relationship
to one another (e.g., one line of thinking recognised as
being illustrative of another); (2) the conception of
opposite possibilities or alternatives (e.g., "The
6 Mark Austin and Hugh Firth.
90
character was X, but at the same time I thought he
might also be Y"); (3) a comparison, or a concern with
choosing or deciding. Category C includes reports with
verbalisation or explanation: subcategory (l) is the
subject himself talking; subcategory (2) is any dream
character using words for the explicit purpose of
explaining (rather than merely description, for example).
If none of these criteria are met, the dream report is
classified as Primary Visual Experience (PVE).
In addition, in the case of a fairly lengthy
sequence, the judges were instructed to score only the
final event. The two judges worked independently and
both were ignorant of the associated waking category for
each report. Agreement on the SCE/PVE dichotomy was
reached on 90$ of cases independently, and reconciliation
reached on the remaining 10$.
7
Two further judges were asked to scrutinise
the dreams collected for the presence of manifest drive
expression. Their instructions were open-ended as to
what represented a 'drive'. As before, both judges were
unaware of either the awakening category or personality
type from which any particular dream was taken.
Initially, the judges worked independently and,
subsequently, met to compare their analyses. At this
reconciliatory meeting (which was also attended by the
author), it was decided to include only those instances
of drive that were considered most likely to pose an
7 Margaret Cormack and Peter Sheldrake.
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overt threat to the dreamer. As a result, aggressive
(in the wide sense, including both verbal and physical
hostility) and sexual interactions were retained and all
other expressions of drive - for example, eating - were
discarded. All manifest aggressive and sexual inter¬
actions were included, irrespective of whether they
related directly to the dreamer himself (they usually
did) or of whether any fear or anxiety was associated
with the drive expression (the case in approximately 50$
of instances). This ad hoc analysis left 16 dream
reports that were considered examples of drive expression
that might prove threatening, 14 of which had been offered
initially by both judges.
The author also counted the number of words used
to describe the last experience. Any redundant phrases
(e.g., "1 /was dreaming about....") were excluded, as were
any obvious repetitions. In fact, repetitions material
proved quite common owing to the often repeated question
"So what was the very last thing?" where this was not
clear. In reports judged to contain more than one
experience, only the last was included in the word
count.
The polygraphic records of the two uninterrupted
baseline nights were analysed by the author. Tracings
were scored for sleep stages according to the current
version of the generally accepted Dement-Kleitman system
(Kales & Rechtschaffen, 1967). Total duration of sleep,
irrespective of stage was calculated, as well as the
duration of REM sleep. Any time spent awake following
the occurrence of a spontaneous awakening during the
course of the night was deducted from the total sleep
time. Sleep featuring predominantly REM sleep
characteristics, but with signs of stage 2 features
(e.g., spindling or K-complexes) interspersed, was not
scored as REM sleep; in other words, only unambiguous
REM sleep was scored as such. The number of discrete
periods of REM sleep was also noted: if more than ten
minutes of unambiguous NREM sleep (no REM sleep features)
elapsed between episodes of REM sleep, the episodes were
regarded as discrete periods; if less than ten minutes,
separated episodes were regarded as belonging to one
period. The duration of sleep prior to the first period
of REM sleep (REM latency) was also recorded. In cases
where the first REM period was •missed', the latency
period was calculated from falling asleep to the 'second1
REM period. Finally, the profusion of rapid eye
movements within REM sleep was calculated. Periods of
REM sleep were split into two-second epochs. The
proportion of these epochs containing one or more eye
movements was determined and expressed as a percentage.
The most likely source of possible error is in
the calculation of these eye movement profusion scores
within REM sleep. Therefore, in order to check the
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author's figures, the four baseline records of the
converger and diverger most closely matched on eye
movement profusion in the author's analysis were re-
g
examined by another judge wilc was unaware of the source
of the records. With respect to amount of REM sleep,
both judges' scoring was in close agreements and,
although the second judge rated both subjects' eye
movement profusion slightly higher (1$ and 1.2$), their
relative standing remained unaltered.
Subsequently, a partial replication was carried
out. Ten of the original 12 subjects - k convergers
and 6 divergers - spent a further k nights in the
laboratory, 2 adaptation and 2 uninterrupted baseline
nights. Once again, 2 subjects were run on each night,
although the original procedure of pairing one converger
with one diverger could not always be adopted owing to
the inequality of the groups. The baseline nights were
9
analysed by 2 judges working 'blind' and the independent
scoring was in close harmony. Unfortunately, some of
the subjects were run on nights when the eye channels
were incorrectly adjusted and, as a result, the eye
movement profusion data could not be accurately measured.
8 Mark Austin once again.
9 Ian Oswald and Hugh Firth.
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THE HYPOTHESES
The major innovation, indeed the crux of the
experimental design, rests on the use of two types of
awakenings one during REM sleep with eye movements
(REM-M); the other during REM sleep without eye
movements (REM-Q). It is the assumption of a clear
link between REM-M and REM-Q activity on the one hand,
and the characteristics of the dream experience on the
other, that lends to the investigation discriminative
power. Therefore, it is essential that this link
is established at the outset. Specifically, it is
hypothesised that:
Awakenings from REM-M activity will elicit dream reports
classified as 'Primary Visual Experience' (PVE), whereas
awakenings from REM-Q activity will elicit dream reports
classified as 'Secondary Cognitive Elaboration* (SCE)
(Hypothesis 1).
If this proves to be the case, we are then in a
position to test the major hypotheses: firstly, the
convergers' tendency to repress threatening dream
experience. As only PVE poses a potential threat to
the dreamer (as argued in Chapter 2), convergers' dream
recall should be poor following awakenings from REM-M
(experimental), but not REM-Q (control), activity.
Therefore, it is hypothesised that:
Awakenings from REM-M activity will elicit fewer dream
reports from convergers than dlvergers, whereas awakenings
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from REM-Q activity will result in no difference in
incidence of dream recall between the two groups
(Hypothesis 2).
The second major hypothesis concerns the
divergers' tendency to defend against their dreams by
intellectual, revisionary means. As the essence of
the SCE/PVE distinction rests on the presence or absence
of intellectual activity, defensive cognitive elaboration
may occur only during SCE and hence (assuming hypothesis 1
is confirmed) during REM-Q activity. If, therefore, they
do elaborate their dreams in the interests of defence, it
may be hypothesised that:
Divergers will spend more time than convergers in REM-Q
activity, particularly during the later, more threatening.
periods of REM sleep (Hypothesis 3).
There is, finally, to be considered the possibility
that convergers may need both more immediate and more
intense dreaming in compensation for their drive-repressing
day. This might be reflected in the distribution of REM
sleep throughout the night and the distribution of eye
movements within REM sleep. It is hypothesised that:
Convergers will display a shorter REM latency, longer
periods of REM sleep early in the night, and a greater
profusion of eye movements during REM sleep throughout





DREAM CHARACTERISTICS AND DREAM RECALL
The direction of the present investigation has
been prompted by the assumption that episodes of REM
sleep with (REM-M) and without (REM-Q) eye movements
house qualitatively distinct dream experiences, PVE and
SCE respectively. It is this proposed link between eye
movement activity and the characteristics of the dream
experienced that promises a discriminative line of attack.
But, as Molinari & Foulkes' original finding in this
direction was to some extent post-hoc. the assumption
remains fragile. Clearly, it is essential that this link
be made secure at the outset.
TABLE 5.1: PERCENTAGE OF DREAM REPORTS CLASSIFIED
AS PVE AND SCE FROM REM-M AND REM-0 AWAKENINGS
N SCE PVE Visual
Reports
REM-M 56 13# 87$ 100#
REM-Q 38 89# 11# 47#
As Table 5.1 demonstrates, the distinction between
dreams collected from the two types of awakening is clear-
cut: with few exceptions, REM-M awakenings elicit dream
reports classified as PVE and REM-Q awakenings reports
that are judged SCE. Hypothesis 1 is established.
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This link between PVE and REM-M activity also
suggests that the previously reported 'dream-like'
quality of mental experience associated with REM sleep
may be related more specifically to the phasic discharge
of eye movements. Admittedly, visual reports occur
frequently (47i°) following arousal from REM-Q activity
also, but this may reflect the 'holding' or reminiscence
of prior dream experience during its subsequent elaboration.
Certainly, the visual imagery associated with REM-Q activity
appears to be of an altogether less peremptory nature than
that associated with REM-M activity; it is there, without
ever captivating the dreamer in the way REM-M related
experience appears to do.1 This is best illustrated by
example.
1 This distinction between tonic and phasic features
of REM sleep is underlined by their dissociation under
certain conditions. For example, cats treated with
parachlorophenylalanine discharge phasic events during
NREM sleep, and while awake, as well as during REM
sleep (Dement, 1969). Of particular interest here is
the observation that phasic discharge during the waking
state is accompanied by hallucinatory behaviour. It
may be, therefore, that the usual synchrony of tonic and
phasic features of REM sleep serves as a 'safety valve',
tonic peripheral motor inhibition permitting phasic-
related psychic expression free reign without the
possibility of behavioural consequences.
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Some Examples of Dreams Collected and their Classification
1. E. "Can you tell me the very last thing that was
passing through your mind just before I woke you?"
S. "It's a bit mixed up.... I seemed to be playing
conkers.... with this girl. She was playing
with.... a diamond I think, big and flashing. I
had an ordinary conker, and every time she hit my
conker it.... hurt me for some reason...."
E. "Go on."
S. "I'm not sure how I came to be doing this....
earlier I.... can't remember."
E. "What was the very last thing?"
S. ".... My conker had just been hit.... and I had
this.,., it was more a flash in front of my eyes
.... I found it uncomfortable. I can't explain
this one well, it's all jumbled up."
E. "Was there visual imagery?"
S. "Yes." iClassification: PVE)
2. E. "Can you tell me the very last thing that was
passing through your mind just before I woke you?"
S. "Yes, just a minute.... I was relating a story of
having beer tipped over my head.... The actual
beer tipping operation hadn't happened in the
dream or whatever, but I was relating the story to a
friend, called John, about being in a bar and















"No, just sitting at a table,... On ray left-hand
side was a girl called Val and John, was sitting
opposite me and that was all".
"Was there visual imagery?"
"Yes, his face was quite plain.... John was sort
of casting his eyes to heaven and laughing."
"So what was the very last thing passing through
your mind?"
"I was just saying they had picked up the frame
and tipped it over my head and it was full of
beer. The frame, I explained, was the thing
they drank out of, they didn't drink out of mugs
or glasses or anything. It was a wooden frame."
(Classification: SCE)
"Can you tell me the very last thing that was
passing through your mind just before I woke you?"
".... I was thinking about blood sports...."
"Anything else?"
"No.... I was just thinking about it.... The very
last thing I was thinking about was Jimmy Edwards
for some reason and he's in favour of it and I was
just trying to think of someone who is not".
"Was there visual imagery?"
"No, none at all." (Classification: SCE)
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k, E. "Can you tell me the very last thing that was
passing through your mind just before I woke you?"
S. ".... I was getting chased by someone with a stick,..."
E. "Anything else?"
S. ".... Not really.... it was as if I was in an
argument. I must have been."
E. "Was there visual imagery?"
S. "Yeah."
E. "Could you describe the visual imagery?"
S. "I was in a kind of wood, not a very dense wood and
I was standing at one side of this tree and he was
standing at the other. It was a Xmas tree that
had died because all the leaves were off it, and
he was running round one way trying to hit me.
That was the last thing. I was laughing and
wasn't taking it seriously even though he seemed
mad at me. There was someone else there but I
don't know who." (Classification: PVE)
The first and fourth reports were taken from REM-M
awakenings and each was classified as PVE by both judges.
Both examples appear to have been experienced vividly
(e.g., the diamond is described as "big and flashing")
despite the hesitant manner in which the first dream, in
particular, was reported. In this first dream, the
hesitancy appears to have been a function of the bizarre
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content, and the "jumbled up" nature of the experience.
In addition, in the morning, the subject - a divergent
architect - reaffirmed that this dream had made him feel
"uncomfortable", which was backed up by his taking an
uncharacteristic (for him) 30 minutes to return to sleep.
In the fourth example, too, the experience appears to
have puzzled the dreamer himself - a divergent engineer,
on this occasion. He displayed more concern with
rationalising the dream situation ("it was as if I was in
an argument. I must have been.") than actually
describing the scene, although this was eventually
extracted in some detail. In both cases, the subjects
describe participating in some event, but in an
intellectually passive way, without apparent reflection
or cognitive elaboration upon the visual imagery at least
during the experience.
The second and third dream reports were taken from
REM-Q awakenings and classified as SCE by both judges.
The second dream involves the retailing of an event,
rather than experiencing the event itself, and is
accompanied by appropriate, seemingly vivid, imagery.
However, here, the dream is reported in a way that
suggests the visual aspect is secondary, serving merely
to authenticate the intellectual activity, the story¬
telling. As the dreamer himself - a convergent engineer -
was relating the tale, this dream was categorised C1. The
third dream - from the same source as the fourth - was
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classified as SCE on two counts. First, as A1 since
the experience was purely conceptual, lacking any visual
2
imagery? second, as B2, since the dreamer was concerned
with thinking of an opposite, someone who dislikes blood
•ports.
2 In fact half (53$) of all REM-Q awakenings elicited
reports in this category.
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Dream Recall - Convergers and Divergers Contrasted
The sharp distinction between dreams collected
from REM-M and REM-Q awakenings lends purpose to the
comparison of convergers and divergers' recall
following the two types of awakening. Figure 5^1
contrasts the dream recall of the groups as a whole;
and Tables 5*2 and 5«3 compare dream recall on an
individual basis. As a group, convergers prove over¬
whelmingly poorer than divergers at recalling dream
content following REM-M awakenings (convergers 50$
recall; divergers 95$) but no poorer following REM-Q
3
awakenings. This is precisely what is predicted by
the repression hypothesis (Hypothesis 2). Moreover,
when looked at on an individual basis (Table 5*2),
convergers prove consistently poorer than divergers at
recalling dream content following REM-M awakenings.
Indeed, 5 of the 6 convergers have a lower recall rate
than any of the 6 divergers following REM-M awakenings
(p<.0 3, two-tailed, Mann-Whitney U Test^).^
3 In fact, the contrast is even more striking as recall
following REM-Q awakenings is superior for convergers, a
point that will be taken up shortly.
h Siegel (1956).
5 The sixth converger, converger F, has perfect recall
but from only k REM-M awakenings. In addition, this
converger is only marginally convergent (about the 30th
percentile from the convergent extreme) within his
engineering group. His selection resulted from the
attempt to match convergers and divergers1 open-ended test
scores. The 2 divergers (G and H) who have less than
perfect recall following REM-M awakenings have only one
failure from 10 and 11 REM-M awakenings respectively.
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FIGURE 5.1
DREAM RECALL BY CONVERGERS AND DIVERGERS WHEN WOKEN DURING


























TABLE 5.28 INDIVIDUAL CONVERGERS AND DIVERGERS« DREAM
RECALL FOLLOWING REM-M AWAKENINGS
Convergers Divergers
No. of Wakings jo Recall No. of Wakings Recall
A. 8 25 G. 10 90
B. 9 33.3 H. 1 1 90
c. 6 50 5. 5 100
D. 5 60 J. 2 100
E. 4 75 K. 7 100
F. 4 100 L. 5 100
TABLE 5.3: INDIVIDUAL CONVERGERS AND DIVERGERS1 DREAM
RECALL FOLLOWING REM-Q AWAKENINGS
Convergers Divergers
No. of Wakings ^ Recall No. of Wakings Recall
A. 3 100 G. 5 100
B. 2 100 H. 0 *
C. 5 100 I. 2 50
D. o * - j. 3 33.3
E. 4 100 K. 8 87.5
F. 6 100 L. 6 67.7
* It proved, impossible to obtain REM—Q awakenings from 1
converger and 1 diverger.
I
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If convergers* poor dream recall following REM-M
activity is merely a reflection of a negative attitude
towards dream experience - generated, for example, by a
personality that attaches little importance to the 'inner
self* - then convergers' recall following REM-Q activity
should be equally affected. If dreams classified as SCE
are less vivid than those classified as PVE, then recall
following REM-M awakenings should in fact prove better
than tint following REM-Q awakenings: indeed, this is
the trend observed in divergers• recall - 95$ of
REM-M awakenings produced dream content as against only
75$ of REM-Q awakenings. If we attempt to explain
convergers' pattern of dream recall in passive terms, we
face a paradox: for convergers prove less able to recall
the very category of dream (PVE) that appears - from both
the physiological and psychological evidence - to be the
more intense.
Furthermore, this poor recall on the convergers'
part does not seem to reflect a difference in the incidence
of their dreams. Of the 18 cases where convergers failed
to recall any content following a REM-M awakening, 16
produced assertions of dreaming, 14 of these quite
spontaneously, backing up the physiological data. In
contrast, there were only 2 REM-M awakenings from which
divergers failed to recall any content, and on both
occasions the individual concerned reported dreamless
sleep.
Indeed this high proportion (89$) of failures
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among convergers in which dreaming was experienced but the
specific content lost may further strengthen the case for
repression. For this type of 1forgotten* report seems
to follow periods of REM sleep characterised by greater
irregularity in the breathing pattern (Shapiro ejb al, 1964),
a pattern which often accompanies anxiety in the waking
state, and may indicate a strong affective component in
the dream experience (Hobson jet al, 1965)# And, as
already mentioned (Chapter 2), showing stressful films
at bedtime both charges the mood of subjects* dreams
(Foulkes & Rechtschaffen, 1964) and increases the
frequency of * forgotten* reports (Goodenough et^ al^, 1974)
compared with nights on which neutral films were shown.
The frequency of dreamless sleep reports, on the other hand,
does not increase. If 'forgotten' reports are removed
from the analysis, the incidence of recall following
REM-M awakenings does not differ for convergers and
divergers.
Even more telling, if anecdotal, is the evidence
offered by the convergers themselves. On 6 of the 16
awakenings eliciting 'forgotten' reports - an impressive
proportion in view of the spontaneity of these remarks -
the subject volunteered that the experience he had
forgotten had been disturbing, unpleasant or bizarret
"Yes.... it was just there.... sorry, it sounds
stupid, but I've forgotten it already. I was
definitely dreaming just as you woke me.... I
wasn't enjoying it...."}
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".... Felt really involved in something...•
quite disturbed about being woken up.";
".... Don't know, but there was something.... I
was conscious of it just before I woke up. I
felt quite surprised by what X was dreaming
about.";
".... I was certainly dreaming about something
.... I don't know.... I felt uneasy....
sorry....";
".... Damn, its gone.... No.... It was odd,
though, I remember that.";
"That dream I couldn't remember last night; I
didn't mention it at the time but I felt quite
anxious about it. Still can't remember it,
I'm afraid....". (reported the following morning).
With respect to REM-Q awakenings (Figure 5«1,
Table 5»3)» the finding that convergers have a higher recall
rate than divergers (p<„05, two-tailed, Mann-Whitney U Test)
was not anticipated. According to the earlier argument,
any forgetting of REM-Q (SCE) experience is passive in
nature and should not differ for the two groups. Here
there is none of the consistency observed in the convergers'
failures following REM-M awakenings. On 3 occasions, the
diverger in question reported uncertainty as to whether he
had been experiencing anything or not; Z claimed they had
not; and the remaining 1 thought he had.
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One alternative to the repression hypothesis - and
one which also allows for the divergers• poorer recall
following REM-Q awakenings - is to attribute the observed
difference to a preference on the part of divergers for
visual material and on the part of convergers for material
that is non-visual; after all, every REM-M awakening
elicited a visual report as against only half (47$) of the
awakenings in the REM-Q category. Such an explanation
seems unlikely, however, as convergers recalled a higher
proportion (55$) of visual reports following REM-Q
awakenings than did divergers (39$)• Moreover, on
this interpretation, engineers display a greater
preference for visual material than either artists or
architects, since engineers recalled dream content on
90$ of REM-M awakenings as against only 67$ for artists
and 68$ for architects.
On the other hand, repression may also be
responsible, indirectly, for the finding that divergers
are poorer than convergers at recalling dream content
following REM-Q awakenings. For if convergers are prone
to repress PVE, they may, as a consequence, suffer less
proactive inhibition^' than do divergers from preceding
PVE during the SCE (REM-Q activity) which follows.
This argument draws some support from the fact that -
despite an interview procedure that stressed the reporting
6 Proactive inhibition refers to forgetting brought
about by an older memory interfering with a more recent
one.
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of the very last mental experience to the exclusion of all
else - divergers made some reference to an earlier
sequence in 28$ of cases following REM-Q awakenings;
convergers did so in only 5$.^
The possibility remains that the poor recall
of the convergers following REM-M awakenings is
attributable to conscious suppression. On the other
hand, both Austin (1971) an<i I have observed considerable
agitation on the part of convergers who fail to recall
what they often declare was vivid, and it seems likely
that this reflects a genuine inability to retrieve the
experience. Moreover, if suppression were responsible,
such a conscious process is difficult to equate with
such ready admissions of vivid experience.
7 This finding is also telling evidence for the
suggestion that divergers prefer intellectual forms of
defence, always assuming that, during episodes of REM-Q
activity, defensive elaboration of experience released
during preceding REM-M episodes may take place.
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Manifest Drive Expression in Dream Reports
While the repression hypothesis is strongly
supported by the dream recall data, the hypothesis itself
hinges on the assumption that REM-M episodes house dream
experiences that are potentially threatening to the
dreamer, whereas REM-Q episodes reflect dream experiences
that are, or have been rendered, innocuous. Evidence in
support of this assumption was discussed in Chapter 2.
And the very fact that convergers proved poorer at
recalling dreams following REM-M awakenings seems to
justify, retrospectively, the original assumption.
Nevertheless, direct evidence relating to the occurrence
of potentially threatening dream experience during
episodes of REM-M and REM-Q activity would clearly be
more satisfactory.
In the hope of providing just such evidence, the
incidence of manifest drive experience in the dream reports
was calculated. Any attempt to include disguised drive
8
expression in the analysis was resisted. And the
scoring of manifest drive expression was restricted to
the occurrence of aggressive or sexual interactions on the
grounds that these seemed most likely to pose a threat
to the dreamer. As a result, the analysis most probably
erred on the side of caution. The findings are presented
in Table 5.4.
8 The difficulties inherent in any such attempt are
legion.
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TABLE 5.4: AWAKENINGS ELICITING DREAM CONTENT
WITH MANIFEST DRIVE (AGGRESSIVE & SEXUAL)
Convergers Divergers
REM-M Awakenings
Total no. of wakings eliciting
dream content! 18 38
No. of these wakings with evidence
of drivei 111
Percentage of these wakings with
drive! 5.5# 29$
REM-Q Awakenings
Total no. of wakings eliciting
dream content! 20 18
No. of these wakings with evidence
of drive! 22
Percentage of these wakings with
drive! 10$ 11$
Convergers recalled few occurrences of aggressive
or sexual interactions following either REM-M or REM-Q
awakenings. However, this does not contradict the
assumption that REM-M activity is associated with
threatening, drive-expressing dreams. For if convergers
are prone to repress, then they should fail to recall the
very dreams that we are seeking. And convergers do fail
to recall no less than 50$ of their dreams following REM-M
awakenings. In other words, if the failures on the part
of convergers are attributable to repression, then these
lost dreams may be regarded as threatening. On this
reasoning, no less than 55$ of convergers' REM-M
awakenings would be associated with threatening dreams,
as against only 10$ of their REM-Q awakenings
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(p=.06, two-tailed, Sign Test^).^
With the divergers, repression was not considered
to be a confounding factor. Certainly, few divergers'
dreams were lost following REM-M awakenings (only 5$).
And here, as Table 5*4 demonstrates, 29$ of the dreams
recalled following REM-M awakenings contained manifest
drive expression as against only 11$ of the dreams recalled
following REM-Q awakenings. If dreams containing drive
11
are expressed as a percentage of all divergent awakenings,
then the difference is maintained: 27.5$ of REM-M
awakenings elicited dreams with drive; only 8.3$ of
REM-Q awakenings elicited dreams with drive (p=.06, two-
tailed, Sign Test). The trend does seem to be in the
direction of REM-M awakenings more frequently eliciting
12 13#
dreams with manifest drive expression. '
9 Siegel, (1956).
10 As all convergers' REM-Q awakenings elicited dream
recall, the 10$ incidence is presumably an accurate
reflection of manifest drive expression in this case.
11 Allowable with divergers as it is reasonable to conclude
that dreams are lost through passive forgetting and not
repression; these lost dreams, therefore, are presumably
not threatening.
12 A closer look at the 11 divergent REM-M awakenings
that elicited drive-expressing dreams, reveals that 4
(36$) of these dreams were classified as SCE; yet only
3 (77>) of the other 45 dreams collected from REM-M
awakenings were classified as SCE (X2=4.67, p<.05» two-
tailed). This association of SCE with drive-expressing
dreams, during, or possibly in very brief episodes
between, bursts of eye movements suggests both that
divergers are prone to respond to drive-expressing dreams
with intellectualisation and that this intellectualisation
(SCE) may play a defensive role.
13 If we again assume that lost convergent REM-M-
related dreams are threatening, it is interesting to note
that twice as many convergent REM-M awakenings (55$) are
associated with threatening, or at least drive-expressing,
dreams than is the case for divergent REM-M awakenings
(27.5$) (X2=4.06, p<.05, two-tailed). This supports the
suggestion that convergers compensate for a drive-
repressing daytime existence in their dreams.
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Length of Dream Reports
If divergers are more likely to respond to
threatening dream experiences with time-consuming
intellectualisation, this tendency may be reflected in
divergers reporting dreams at greater length following
REM-Q awakenings. On the other hand, as cognitive
elaboration does not seem to take place to any extent
during REM-M activity (Table 5»1)» there should be no
difference in the length of dream reports elicited from
convergers and divergers following REM-M awakenings.
It is always possible, of course, that convergent and
divergent reporting styles may influence the length of
dreams collected quite independently of any
intellectualisationj in which case dreams collected from
both types of awakening should be equally affected. In
order to elucidate this question, the length of dream
reports collected from convergers and divergers were
1 b
contrasted over both types of awakening.
TABLE 5.5; MEAN LENGTH (NO, OF WORDS) OF DREAM
REPORTS BY CONVERGENCE/DIVERGENCE
Convergers Divergers p* (two-
tailed)
All wakings 62.5 n. s.
REM-M wakings 67.7 67.4 n. s.
REM-Q wakings 5b,o 86.9 <.10
Diff. between REM-M and
REM-Q wakings +13.7 -19.5 <.06
♦Computed by the Mann-Whitney U Test (Siegel, 1956).
Group means were obtained from individual averages.
lb Two of the 12 subjects - 1 converger and 1 diverger -
were excluded from the analysis as neither recalled a dream
taken from REM-Q activity.
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As Table 5«5 makes clear, the mean number of words
used to describe dream experiences following REM-M
awakenings was found to be almost identical for convergers
1 5
and divergers, This similarity rules out the possibility
that differences in the style of convergers and divergers*
reporting might have some general effect on the length of
their dream reports. REM-Q awakenings, on the other hand,
did elicit dreams differing in length between convergers
and divergers| divergers used about 6o$> more words to
describe their REM-Q-related experiences (p<«10, two-
tailed, Mann-Whitney U Test).
Comparing dreams collected from the two types of
awakening, convergers describe REM-Q experiences more
briefly, on average, than REM-M experiences, whereas the
opposite is true of divergers. Moreover, this trend is
remarkably consistent between individuals within either
group, with one notable exception. This exception was,
once again, the convergent engineer who was only
marginally convergent relative to the other engineering
students. For this subject, REM-Q reports were found to
average 25 • 7 words more than REM-M reports. Remove this
convergent engineer and the average difference score
increases to +22.5 for the convergent group, as well as
leaving no overlap whatsoever on these difference scores
15 As only the last preawakening dream experience was
sought, and only this experience scored, repression was not
expected to affect the length of dream reports taken from
REM-M activity. If anything, this finding supports the
view that repression acts in an all-or-nothing way on any
particular experience - either the experience is lost
altogether or it emerges untouched.
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between the convergent and divergent groups (p<.02, two-
tailed, Mann-¥hitney U Test).
The inference from these findings is plain:
divergers only elaborate during dream experiences
associated with REM-Q episodes. This is in keeping
not only with the hypothesis that divergers resort to
intellectualisation in handling their dreams but also
that this intellectualisation is restricted to periods
16
of REM sleep without eye movements.
While considerable comfort may be drawn from
these findings relating to dream length, the crucial
test of the intellectualisation hypothesis rests on an
analysis of the distribution of eye movement activity
within REM sleep. It is to this physiological data
that we now turn.
16 A consideration of dream length by academic discipline
and by open-ended test performance was also undertaken.
These two analyses add little to the picture and are




This chapter considers the physiological data
collected from the uninterrupted baseline nights. In the
original study, 2 convergers - 1 through illness and the other
a spoiled recording - had only one baseline night on which to
draw. All other subjects' data was averaged over the two
baseline nights, and group means obtained from these
individual averages. Table 6.1 summarises the scoring of
these baseline nights:
TABLE 6.1: REM SLEEP PATTERNS OF CONVERGERS AND DIVERGERS
Original Expt. Replication
Conver- Diver- p]["two- Conver- Diver- p (two-

















































+Interval between falling asleep and first period of REM sleep.
*Proportion of two-second epochs within REM sleep containing
one or more eye movements, expressed as a percentage.
Probabilities were computed using a Mann-Whitney U Test
(Siegel, 1956).
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Although subjects were not allowed to sleep as
long as they wished (they spent no more than 8^- hours in
bed), there is over an hour difference between convergers
and divergers in the average time spent asleep during the
original study. This difference is not maintained in the
replication study, however.^ Divergers also spend longer
in REM sleep each night, even when expressed as a percentage
2
of total sleep time. This may be attributable to the
divergers' longer sleep since, both proportionately and
absolutely, more time is spent in REM sleep as total sleep
time lengthens. Also linked to length of sleep, divergers
3
are more likely to have an extra period of REM sleep.
Finally - and by far the most consistent difference between
the two groups - divergers have a much lower profusion of
eye movements during REM sleep than convergers. Profusion
scores express the clustering and frequency of eye movements:
they are measured by recording the proportion (expressed as a
percentage) of two-second epochs within REM sleep containing
one or more eye movements. This finding is predicted by
both the intellectualisation and compensation hypotheses.
1 The discrepancy between the two studies is not as large
as it appears in Table 6.1 as the 4 convergers who participated
in the replication averaged 411 minutes of sleep in the
original investigation. Clearly, whether convergers are,
in fact, shorter sleepers than divergers requires
clarification. In this connection, Hartmann e_t al (1971a,
1972) have reported personality profiles typical of habitual
short and long sleepers that are reminiscent of those found
in convergers and divergers, respectively.
2 Although the trend is the same in both studies, both
convergers and divergers spent more time in REM sleep during
the replication. Reasons for this are discussed in
Appendix V1.
3 Combining the two studies, divergers had 5 periods of
REM sleep on 12 occasions (and a sixth on 1 occasion)
during their 2k baseline nights; convergers had only 6
fifth REM periods during 18 baseline nights.
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Table 6.2 contrasts the first two periods of REM
sleep of the night with those succeeding:
TABLE 6.2; REM SLEEP PATTERNS OF CONVERGERS AND DIVERGERS -
EARLY AND LATE PERIODS OF REM SLEEP CONTRASTED
REM periods 1 & 2*
Original Expt. Replication
Conver- Diver- p(two- Conver- Diver- p(two-
gers gers tailed) gers gers tailed
(n=6) (n=6) (n=k) (n= £)
Mean duration per
night (rains) 30.8 26.8 n.s. 36.5 29.7 n.s.
Mean $ eye move¬
ment profusion 22.8$ 17.6$ n.s.
REM periods 3 onwards
Mean duration per
night (mins) 42.9 72.7 .03 65.0 86.1 .01
Mean $ eye move¬
ment profusion 27.9$ 20.9$ .002
* On occasions where the first REM period was 'missed', 'REM
periods 1 & 2' include only the 'second' REM period; in
other words, the succeeding REM periods are ranked as if the
missed first REM period had occurred.
Probabilities were computed using a Mann-Whitney U Test.
This contrast of early and late periods of REM sleep
reveals that the divergent pattern of spending more time
in REM sleep is restricted to the latter part of the night.
Indeed, during the early part of the night, it is the
convergers who spend more time in REM sleep. Convergers
also discharge more eye movements within REM sleep than
divergers during these early periods of REM sleep.
Neither difference satisfied statistically on its own;
yet, coupled together, these two trends highlight a
clearcut difference. Whereas both groups discharge
virtually identical amounts of eye movement activity within
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REM sleep over the course of the whole night, convergers
discharge 50$ more than divergers during the first two
periods of REM sleep (convergers, 210.4 two-second epochs
containing eye movements; divergers, 141.5 epochs;
p<.02, two-tailed, Mann-Whitney U Test); and
correspondingly less during the later periods of REM
sleep (convergers, 370.0; divergers, 4-52.5j not
significant). If these figures are recast in proportionate
terms, all 6 convergers have more of their night's REM-M
activity during the first two REM periods than any of the
divergers (convergers, 36.3$; divergers, 23.8$;
p<.002, two-tailed , Mann-Whitney U Test). This finding
that convergers discharge more eye movement activity than
divergers early in the night reflects, according to the
compensation hypothesis, a need on the part of convergers
for moi-e immediate dreaming.
During the latter part of the night, as already
mentioned, it is the divergers who spend significantly
more time in REM sleep. While this may be explained, in
the original study, merely by divergers spending longer
asleep, such an interpretation does not account so readily
for the similar pattern in the replication - indeed at an
increased level of significance. However, this
observation may well reflect divergers' use of time-
consuming intellectualisation in handling the more affective
content of dreams associated with these later periods of
REM sleep (Foulkes, 1966).
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The most striking difference between convergers
and divergers during these later periods of REM sleep
is found, once again, in the profusion of rapid eye
movements. On this occasion, there is no overlap
whatsoever between the two groups, each converger
displaying a higher eye movement profusion than any of
the divergers. Moreover, this pattern proves remarkably
consistent across individual periods of REM sleep (Table 6.3):
TABLE 6.3: EYE MOVEMENT PROFUSION IN CONVERGERS
AND DIVERGERS - INDIVIDUAL REM PERIODS CONTRASTED
Mean Percentage Eye Movement Profusion
Convergers Divergers p(two-tailed)
REM Period
1 18.5 12.0 .08
2 23.5 19.3 n. s
3 28.4 20.9 .04
4 26.1 19.3 .08
5 31.0 21.1 .08
Probabilities were computed using a Mann-Whitney U Test.
For each of the later periods of REM sleep - REM periods 3»
4 & 5 - as well as for the first REM period of the night,
convergers discharge a significantly higher profusion of
eye movements. This pattern in the first REM period -
and a similar trend in the second - provides further
support for the compensation hypothesis in particular.
However, the convergers' higher profusion rates in the
later REM periods are more difficult to interpret, for
both .the intellectualisation (Hypothesis 3) and the
compensation (Hypothesis 4) hypotheses predict this
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difference in eye movement profusion between convergers
and divergers during the latter part of the night. In
support of the intellectualisation hypothesis, this
finding may reflect a divergent tendency to spend more
time in the totally quiescent episodes of REM sleep that
have been linked with SCE; alternatively, divergers may
merely spend longer than convergers in low frequency eye
movement discharge. In support of the compensation
hypothesis, on the other hand, the convergers' higher eye
movement profusion may reflect more sustained eye movement
activity associated with intense dreaming; although,
equally, convergers' profusion rates may be explained by
their having fewer episodes of REM-Q activity. Clearly,
at this level of analysis, eye movement profusion rates
cannot distinguish between the contending hypotheses.
In an attempt to disentangle the intellectualisation
and compensation hypotheses, a still closer analysis of
the distribution of eye movements within the later periods
of REM sleep was undertaken (Table 6,b). On the
intellectualisation hypothesis, divergers should spend
5
more time in REM-Q activity, that is page intervals with
b These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. It is
possible that both effects contribute to the convergers'
higher eye movement profusion.
5 The choice of 'pages' (i.e. 20 seconds of polygraphic
recording) as the interval was a compromise between taking
too large or too small an episode of time: too large
might result in a similar figure for a very different
pattern, for example if a minute (i.e. 3 pages) was the
unit, '355' and '10 5 0' would both be scored '15' yet
be clearly different; too small would tell us no more
than Tables 6.2 and 6.3. As 30 seconds of ocular quiescence
was the criteria for a REM-Q awakening, this period would
have been used, but, as at constituted 1-j- pages of
recording, it would have proved inconvenient in practice.









































































































*Eachpagerepresents20s condsofREMl p(i. .1two-sepo h ). Probabilitieswercomput dus ngMann-WhitneyUTe t.
to lo
124
zero eye movements. On the,, compensation hypothesis,
convergers should have more pages with, say, 8, 9 and
10 epochs containing eye movements. In absolute terms,
(Table 6.4a), divergers do spend far more time in episodes
of REM sleep with no eye movements whatsoever. As
convergers spent only about 60$ as much time as divergers
in these later periods of REM sleep, the proportionate
amount of time spent in each category of eye movement
activity was also tabulated (Table 6.4b). Again, quite
clearly, divergers spend more time in REM-Q activity. In
absolute terms, pages with low numbers of epochs containing
eye movements are also more prevalent among divergers
(Table 6.4a). However, these differences disappear when
looked at proportionately (Table 6.4b). Divergers, then,
do spend more time in REM-Q activity during later periods
of REM sleep which is associated with SCE. SCE, in turn,
may serve in a defensive capacity against dream experience
of a threatening nature.
Turning to REM sleep with sustained eye movement
activity, convergers are more likely than divergers, in
absolute terms, to produce pages with 9 and 10 epochs
containing eye movements (Table 6.4a), In view of the
much shorter time spent by convergers in these later REM
periods, this finding is quite remarkable. And when
looked at proportionately this effect is even more marked,
pages with 6, 8, 9 and 10 epochs of eye movement activity
all occurring significantly more frequently with convergers
125
(Table 6.4b). In fact, owing to the high proportion
of time spent by divergers in pages with zero eye
movements, convergers spend proportionately more time
in every other category of eye movement activity
(Table 6.4b). In order to remove this influence,
pages with zero eye movements were excluded (Table 6.4c).
This gives a striking 'cross-over' effect, divergers
spending proportionately more time than convergers in
each category of light eye movement activity (i.e., pages
with 1 to 5 epochs containing eye movements) and
proportionately less time than convergers in each category
of more sustained eye movement activity (i.e., pages with
6 to 10 epochs containing eye movements). Convergers,
then, do spend more time, both proportionately and
absolutely, in sustained eye movement activity than
divergers, substantiating the hypothesis that convergers
compensate for a relatively unimaginative daytime
existence with more intense dreams. The findings
presented in Table 6.4 are summarised in Figure 6.1.
As already indicated, convergers and divergers
discharge virtually identical amounts of eye movement
activity over the course of the whole night: convergers,
580.4 epochs of REM sleep containing eye movements each
night; divergers, 594.0. What differs is the
distribution of these eye movements; divergers seem to
require a greater amount of REM sleep to discharge a
similar amount of eye movement activity.
FIG 6.1
EYE MOVEMENT DISCHARGE WITHIN REM SLEEP -


































Eye movement activity has been grouped into 3 categories: periods of eye
movement quiescence (rEM-q), ie, pages with zero eye movement; periods
of 'light' eye movement activity, ie, pages with 1-5 epochs containing
eye movements; and periods of sustained eye movement activity, ie, pages
with 6-10 epochs containing eye movements. The contrast is striking:
divergers clearly spend proportionately more REM sleep in episodes of
eye movement quiescence than convergers; and convergers spend
proportionately more time than divergers in sustained eye movement
activity. Both groups spend a similar proportion of their REM sleep in
episodes of light eye movement activity.
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On closer inspection, then, the striking
difference between convergers and divergers in the
distribution of eye movements within REM sleep provides
strong support for both the intellectualisation and
compensation hypotheses - always providing certain
assumptions are accepted. In the case of the
intellectualisation hypothesis, if it is accepted that
SCE may serve to mollify potentially threatening dream
experiences, then their pattern of spending a high
proportion of REM sleep in REM-Q activity - and hence
SCE - does suggest that divergers make considerable use
of intellectual modes of defence. And, with respect to
the compensation hypothesis, if it is accepted that
sustained eye movement activity is reflected in the
intensity of the associated dream experience - an assertion
backed by evidence as strong as any relating physiological
events to psychological experience - then convergers do
display a pattern of eye movement activity indicative of
more intense dream experience.
Duration of REM Sleep
As already indicated (Table 6.2), convergers spend
longer than divergers in the first two REM periods of the
night, whereas divergers spend significantly longer than
convergers in the remaining REM periods of the night.
Tentatively, these findings have been interpreted as
providing support for the compensation and intellectualisation
hypotheses, respectively. A closer inspection of the
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distribution of REM sleep throughout the night - by-
examining the time spent in individual REM periods - may
serve to clarify the interpretation of these two findings.
Firstly, the difference observed between convergers and
divergers on the first two REM periods may assume
statistical significance for one or other of the two REM
periods under separate treatment. And if this difference
should prove significant for the first REM period in
particular - suggesting a convergent need for more immediate
dreaming - then the compensation interpretation would be
placed on still firmer ground. Secondly, this analysis
will clarify the source of the difference between
convergers and divergers in the time spent in REM sleep
during the latter part of the night. For this difference
may be attributable entirely to the divergent pattern of
spending longer sleep (and therefore having more REM
periods); in which case there would be no need to invoke
intellectualisation in explanation. Alternatively,
divergers may consistently spend longer in each of these
later REM periods; if this is established, then this
analysis will further substantiate the intellectualisation
hypothesis.
Table 6.5 contrasts the duration of individual
REM periods for convergers and divergers:
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TABLE 6.5: DURATION OF INDIVIDUAL REM PERIODS -
CONVERGERS AND DIVERGERS CONTRASTED
REM Periods* (mean duration in minutes)




gers l4.0(n= 6) 22.2 (n= 9) 22.l(n= 9) 22.9(n= 7) 17.3(n=
Diver-
gers 7.5(n= 9) 22.l(n=12) 24.5(n=12) 36.3(n=10) 34.6(n=
p(two-




gers 12.9(n= 5) 28.9(n= 8) 20.5(n= 8) 38.3(n= 8) 24.8(n=
Diver-
gers 9•4(n=10) 22.l(n=12) 35.4(n=12) 4l.4(n=12) 19.6(n=
p(two-
tailed) n.s. .07 «04 n.s. n.s.
Overall
Conver¬
gers 13.6(n=11) 25.1(n=17) 20.2(n=17) 28.7(n=15) 20.0(n=
Diver-
gers 8.6(n=19) 22.l(n=24) 30.0(n=24) 39.7(n=22) 27.7(n=1
p(two-
tailed) .09 n.s. .04 .09 n.s.
* /
Once again, on nights where a first (and, in one case,
a second) REM period was missed, subsequent REM periods were
ranked as if the missed period had occurred. In the
original study, those REM periods that may have been
interrupted by traffic were included (see Appendix VI), but
those that did not occur at all, rather than being scored
zero, were excluded altogether from the analysis. The
overall means were calculated, as before, from the
individuals' averages, over both studies where applicable.
Probabilities were computed using a Mann-Whitney U Test.
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For REM periods 1 and 2, and combining the data
From both the original and replication studies, convergers
spend significantly longer than divergers in the first
but not the second REM period (although a similar trend
is evident). In fact, in the original study, convergers
spent almost twice as long, on average, in this first
REM period. This is as predicted by the compensation
hypothesis. However, a better indicator of the amount
of •essential1 (unelaborated PVE) dreaming would seem to
be the time spent in REM-M activity. This may be
calculated by combining the duration of the first REM
period with the eye movement profusion during this period
(from Table 6.3)• This combination reveals that
convergers spend on average 2.59 minutes (77»7 two-second
epochs) in REM-M activity during the first REM period
in the original study; divergers, on the other hand,
average only 0.90 minutes (27 two-second epochs) of
REM-M activity during the first REM period. Indeed,
there is no overlap whatsoever between convergers and
divergers on this measure (p<.002, two-tailed, Mann-
Whitney U Test). Convergers, then, experience far more
phasic-related PVE during this first REM period, a
finding that adds further strength to the compensation
hypothesis.
Turning to the later REM periods, and once more
combining the data from both studies, divergers spend
significantly longer than convergers in both the third
and fourth REM periods of the night. The length of the
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fifth REM period, on the other hand, did not differ
consistently between convergers and divergers, but
this period proved very erratic in length occurring as
6
it does around morning arousal. This, then, confirms
the view that the greater amount of REM sleep
experienced by divergei's during the latter part of the
night is not merely a function of spending longer
asleep. Rather, this consistent pattern may reflect
an increasing preoccupation, on the part of divergers,
with intellectual activity, brought into play to handle
the increasing volume of threatening material associated
with later REM periods (Foulkes, 1966).
The durations of successive REM periods over
the course of the night are mapped for convergers and
divergers in Figure 6.2, and here too distinctive
pictures emerge for the two groups. For the convergers,
the duration of the second REM period significantly
exceeds that of the first, but thereafter there is no
7
notable increase. For the divergers, however, there
is a significant increase in the time spent in each
successive REM period up to and including the fourth of the
6 Again, there are discrepancies between the original
and replication studies during the later REM periods.
Reasons for this are discussed in Appendix V1. The
consequences of these discrepancies for the present
analysis are also discussed in Appendix V1 where it is
argued they do not significantly alter the findings.
7 However, if disrupted fourth REM periods in the
original study are adjusted (see Appendix Vl), the
fourth REM period does exceed both the second (p<.02,
two-tailed) and the third (p<.03> two-tailed) REM
periods.
FIGURE 6.2
SUCCESSIVE REM PERIODS OF THE NIGHT - CONVERGERS AND




























* All significance levels are two-tailed; probabilities
were computed using a Mann-Whitney U test
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g
night. Once again, these different patterns
between convergers and divergers are best explained in
terras of the increasing use of intellectualisation in
parrying more threatening dreams as the night's sleep
progresses. Convergers, in contrast, do not appear
to require more time to express more threatening dreams
which may be explained by their preference for repressing
such material.
REM Latency
Table 6.1 demonstrated a trend, in both studies,
toward convergers having a shorter REM latency than
9
divergers. In neither study was this a significant
effect, however. But on several nights subjects missed
their first REM period of the night and, on these
occasions, REM latency was calculated from falling asleep
8 This remained the case even after the overall means
of the third and fourth REM periods had been adjusted
upwards to compensate for interrupted REM periods in the
original study (see Appendix V1), although significance
levels did alter: the significance level between REM
periods 2 and 3 increased to .002 (two-tailed) and
between REM periods 3 and h decreased to .09 (two-tailed).
9 REM latency refers to the interval between falling
asleep and first entering REM sleep.
134
to the •second' REM period (i.e., the first one
expressed).^ if these extended REM latencies are
excluded from the analysis, thai the difference between
convergers and divergers on this variable assumes
significance (Table 6.6), a finding predicted by the
compensation hypothesis.
TABLE 6.6: REM LATENCY - CONVERGERS AND DIVERGERS CONTRASTED
p (two-
Converters Diverfcers tailed)
Nights Mean Range Nights Mean Range
Original Expt. 6 58.3 44-79 9 78.6 61-116 .10
Replication 5 55.5 34-80 10 80.4 57-119 .04
Overall* 11 37.6 3^-80 19 79.7 57-119 .04
*
In cases where individuals participated in both studies
(10 of the 12), their REM latencies were averaged over the
two studies. As before, group means were calculated from
these individual averages.
Probabilities were computed using a Mann-Whitney U Test.
10 These missed first REM periods occurred on 7 nights
(4 convergent and 3 divergent) during the original study
and on 5 nights (3convergent and 2 divergent) during the
replication. Three convergers and 2 divergers each
missed their first REM period on 2 out of 4 nights; and
another converger missed 1 first and 1 second in the
course of 3 nights. In other words, half of the subjects
account for 12 of the 13 instances of missed REM periods.
It may be that these missed REM periods reflect an
adjustment made to bridge a discrepancy between the
individuals' circadian rhythms and the constraints of a
24 hour day. If this is the case, some individuals'
circadian rhythms appear more 'out of sorts' with the
24 hour schedule - and, therefore, require more frequent
adjustment - than others.
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Also consistent with the compensation hypothesis,
although not specifically predicted, is the convergers'
reaction to missed first REM periods. On each of the
7 occasions convergers missed a first REM period, a
spontaneous awakening occurred. Moreover, on these
nights with no first REM period, convergers tended to
delay returning to deep sleep and appeared to make second
and oven third attempts to enter REM sleep, with each
1 1
attempt again culminating in an awakening. 1 Divergers,
on the other hand, did not wake during the period of
'light' sleep surrounding any of the 5 occasions on which
they missed a first REM period. Divergers also returned
to deep sleep more readily following a miss. This
contrast may reflect a greater reluctance on the part of
convergers to forego their first REM period of the night,
even to the extent of, on one occasion, apparently
delaying the miss until the second REM period, a most
unusual occurrence: and, when the first REM period is
missed, convergers respond by waking which may reflect
anxiety on their part. In other words, on this
interpretation, convergers are again displaying a greater
need for REM sleep, and presumably dreaming, than
divergers: not only do they tend to enter REM sleep
earlier in the night's sleep, they are also more
disturbed by the loss of the first opportunity to do so.
11 There was a solitary exception.
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TABLE 6.7: A SUMMARY OF THE DIFFERENCES IN REM SLEEP
PATTERNING OBSERVED BETWEEN CONVERGERS AND PIVERGERS
REM Sleep Typical Convergent Typical Divergent
Characteristics Pattern Pattern
REM sleep latency short long
Length of REM sleep
over whole night short long
B




ing) REM periods short long
Eye movement
profusion during .
first REM period high low
Eye movement
profusion during . „
later REM periods high low
A
Patterns suggesting a need for immediate and intense
dream experience on the part of convergers.
g
Patterns suggesting the use of intellectualisation





The primary concern of this dissertation has been
the experimental investigation of* the hypothesis that
different defensive orientations underpin convergent
and divergent thinking. And the findings in this
direction have added substance to Hudson's suggestion
that divergers are more likely to use intellectual
strategies of ego-defence, whereas convergers more
typically resort to repression. In addition, convergers
displayed every indication of a greater need to dream
than divergers, suggesting that they compensate for their
drive-repressing day during the night. The research has
also highlighted a promising new research tool, namely
the psychological distinction between tonic and phasic
features of REM sleep.
At a theoretical level, the confirmation of
contrasting defensive orientations in convergent and
divergent thinkers has bolstered Hudson's developmental
model outlined in Chapter 1. In view of this early flush
of success, the model merits closer attention. This
finding is not only of theoretical interest, however.
Above all else, it emphasises that to think in a
convergent or divergent manner is no mere conscious choice.
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The ways in which we think, as much as any other personal
attribute, spring from deep-seated needs and reflect the
adjustments we have made in seeking some sort of balance
for our personalities. To tamper with our cognitive
style once set is to tamper with this balance. Yet the
educational process often does just that. For
education is never value-free. Albeit unintentionally,
the teacher brings to his students an approach rooted in
tradition and enriched with strong personal preference.
Little wonder that those that survive the initiation rites
of specialisms share much in common. The straitjacketing
is personal. To fail to identify will not only be
vineomfortable in a personal sense, it will also increase
the likelihood of academic failure. The few who do
persevere in an antagonistic academic environment may
intensify their defences and cope. But, beyond a
certain point, defensiveness becomes counter—productive
not to say maladaptive. Perhaps this system is effective
in weeding out students unsuitable for a particular
discipline. However, to be an academic misfit, in the
sense used here, need not necessarily lead to an
unsuccessful career in that field. Are we in fact
removing individuals different enough to add something new
to their discipline?1 We do not know and without a change
in educational approach we will not find out.
1 It is striking how often major contributions are made
by individuals who have been both uninspiring as students
and quite unlike their academic colleagues (e.g., Charles
Darwin, Albert Einstein and Francis Crick).
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Turning to dreaming, does this research add
anything to our understanding of the dream?
Certainly, many would be dissatisfied with the manner
in which dream experience has been handled in this
thesisj laboratory man at his insensitive best
quantifying away the richness and variety of the dream
experience itself. Even where phenomenal aspects have
been broached, attention has been steered away from the
detail of the dream content in favour of the dream1s
formal expression. However, this treatment reflects
the nature of the research design rather than any
underlying commentary on the quality of the dream
experience. Indeed, the exploration of defensive
mechanisms within the context of dreaming implies that
the dream has psychological significance in its own right:
one does not, after all, defend against meaningless chatter.
Despite this apparent neglect of the dream as a
psychological entity, this research does have something
to offer dream theory. The contrast struck between PVE
and SCE serves to emphasise the non-rational source of
dreams. In Molinari & Foulkes' terms, "PVE bears the
stamp of an eruption from the unconscious". At any rare,
PVE is quite unlike thought worked on at a conscious level:
it seems to arrive in the conscious fully-formed. This
contrast between PVE and SCE - the switch within the dream
from primary process thought to secondary process
thought - is unmistakable 5 and the difference in their
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formal properties lends credence to the idea that dreams
are launched from unconscious, non-rational sources.
This view, of course, is not unique to Freudian
dream theory. Of more particular comfort to protagonists
of Freud's theory is the observation that convergers have
more immediate and more intense dreaming (REM sleep) as
this suggests, quite forcefully, that dreaming compensates
for the repressions of drive that convergers practice as
a matter of habit during the day. The evidence thus
supports Freud's central theme - that dreams provide an
outlet for 'wishes' not expressed by day. This finding
is also consonant with Jung's more specific suggestion
relating to the compensatory function of the unconsciousj
namely, that a dream can serve as a counterbalance to the
attitude a person consciously holds.
The notion that both repression and secondary
revision is used in handling anxiety-provoking manifest
dream content is also well supported. In one respect,
however - and it is a crucial one - the remarkably high
incidence of convergent dream recall failures attributed
here to repression would seem to challenge psychoanalytic
theory. Freud suggested that it is the function of
manifest dreaming to conceal the unacceptable. Why, then,
should the converger repress when he has, if Freud is right,
already concealed the threatening ideas under more trivial
ones? One way round this interpretative puzzle is to
adopt the Jungian viewpointt to claim that the language
of dreams, although symbolic and difficult to understand,
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does not attempt to conceal anything.
An alternative explanation - and one which retains
the function of the 'dream-work* - focuses on the question
of what is and what is not acceptable. Freud was
referring to the specific content of dream-thoughts
which would be 'painful * if made too explicit in the manifest
dream. And it was in his view the task of the 'dream-work*
to disguise such 'wishes* in the dream experience. However,
if what is unacceptable to the converger is not just the
specific content of his painful dream-thoughts but the
whole shadowy underworld of primary process mental
functioning over which he can exert no conscious, rational
control - the world on which dreams draw - then the poor
levels of recall that convergers display make good sense.
Certainly, the spontaneous comments offered by convergers
following a failure to recall after a REM-M awakening
(see Chapter 5) suggest a general uneasiness over the
nature of the dream experience as much as any reaction to
the specific content of the dream. And much of the evidence
marshalled in Chapter 1 suggests a pervasive alienation
on the paz't of convergers from their own emotional workings!
overtly, these are denigrated as meaningless and without
value; covertly, they seem to be perceived by convergers
as profoundly disturbing. On this argument, then, PVE -
the primary process intrusion - represents a potential threat
not only through its specific message but also by making the
converger aware of his own 'alien' mental world and its
power. SCE, in contrast, offers the converger the security
of orderly, rational secondary process thought.
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If this point of view is accepted, there still
remains one important doubt. For if it is the primary
process thought as such that the converger needs to
defend himself against, why does the converger recall
any material from REM-M awakenings at all? The result
one would predict from such an interpretative stance is
that the convergers* recall from REM-Q awakenings would
be excellent (as it is), but that the rate of recall
from REM-M awakenings would be very much lower than the
50^ observed. What is needed, in other words, is some
means of distinguishing - within primary visual experience -
between the ideas or images likely to create great anxiety
among convergers and those likely to create relatively
little anxiety.
Fortunately, there is a practical method for
investigating such differences - although one that lies
outside the scope of the present inquiry. This would
make use of a sample in which all degrees of convergence
and divergence were represented, rather than extreme
groups only. It should then be possible to identify,
by means of a content analysis of the dreams reported,
certain types of content which are acceptable to moderate
convergers but not to extreme convergers; and, similarly,
of course, types which are acceptable to all-rounders and
mild divergers, but which mild convergers appear to block
or forget. Such a project could not exclude definitively
the possibility that convergers have different sorts of
dream from divergers; nor that their tendency to forget
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might be caused not by the dream's content but by some
other more superficial consideration - for instance,
the interference created by the individual's mental
activity on first waking up. Such rival explanations
make no reference to psychodynamic processes, and to
that extent might be thought attractive. On the other
hand, they do not accommodate the full range of evidence
now availablea in particular the fact that convergers
display greater profusion of REMs - a finding that fits
naturally into the psychoanalytic frame of reference,
but renders any of its apparently more parsimonious rivals
strained to the point of unacosptability.
One consequence of such research, then, is to
remove the notions of repression and of the unconscious
from the centre of attention; and to replace these with
the distinction, equally vital to the Freudian corpus,
between primary and secondary process thought - both of
which lie within the sphere of consciousness, and which,
strictly speaking, are suppressed or forgotten rather
than repressed. What is at stake, as far as the
differences between convergers and divergers are
concerned, is less the curtailing of consciousness by
draconian and repressive means; more the maintenance of
a boundary between two types or modes of thought - one
intuitive and immediate, the other more rational-seeming
and sustained.
Finally, this study has something to offer future
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research into sleep and dreaming. The linking of REM
sleep patterning with personal differences, in particular,
prompts exciting new avenues. For, on the basis of other
research, we now know that we have the means of
manipulating the patterning of REM sleep by pharmacological/
2
dietary means. What psychological effects would this
have? Would the effects differ for different personalities?
One intriguing possibility would be that of modifying
personality by changing REM sleep patterning. If, for
example, intensifying REM sleep intensifies drive
expression in dreams (for which there is considerable
support, e.g., Evans & Oswald, 1966), what effect, if any,
would this have on waking behaviour? Can we make the
converger more or less convergent? The aggressive more
or less aggressive? The over-eater, the smoker or the
drinker worsen or moderate his intake? Alleviate
schizophrenic or depressive symptoms? Finally, studies
with women may prove fruitful in this context. For the
caprices of the menstrual cycle, of going on and off
2 These studies are discussed in Appendix V11,
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contraceptive pills and of pregnancy may all signal
3
changes in the patterning of REM sleep.
This study, then, has posed more questions than it
has answered. Many we had not previously thought to ask}
and the answers promise to be of practical as well as
theoretical concern. What is now needed is research of
an interdisciplinary nature that will allow us to link
together the various levels of biological and psychological
functioning that make up the human condition* biochemical
events} physiological expressions such as the menstrual
cycle and REM sleep patterning} mental experience,
whether by day or night} and the diverse aspects of life¬
style, ranging from occupational choice to diet. It is
doubtful whether large-scale correlational studies will
prove helpful in this context; gross averages will tell
us little about the individual. What is sought is a
closer examination of the relationship between these
different levels of functioning, individual by individual.
3 On the evidence of the little research that has been
done in this area, Hartmann (1966a) found an increase in
REM sleep (eye movement profusion was not measured)
during ovulation and premenstrually, especially in those
with premenstrual tension. More recently, Ho (1972) has
found no increase in REM sleep premenstrually in women
without symptoms of premenstrual tension. Hartmann
also reported more REM sleep on than off a contraceptive
pill (Enovid). Neither of the above increases in REM
sleep were associated with changes in total sleep time.
These increases fit the biochemical argument advanced in
Appendix V11 as both oestrogen and progesterone influence
the rate of turnover of brain serotonin (Rose, 1969}
Tonge & Greengrass, 1971} Ladisich, 1974). It is
tempting to link psychological changes such as premenstrual
tension, loss of libido on the contraceptive pill and





Each of the five words below has more than one








Below are five everyday objects. Think
as many different uses as you can for each.
(1) A barrel
(2) A paper clip










Six channels were used for each subject. Potential
differences were recorded between the following pairs of
electrode placements: 3-5 and 4-6 (EOG channels); 7-8 and
4-8 (EEG channels); 1-2 and 1-6 (submental EMG channels).
Using 2 channels for each electrophysiological variable
lessened the chance of losing one of the variables through a
faulty electrode connection developing during the course of
the night. Despite this, if electrodes 1 or 8 loosened,
this could still lead to interference on both EMG or EEG
channels. Where interference occurred, it could be
rectified by switching from the faulty electrode to another
suitable one. For example, if electrode 7 developed a
fault, the 7-8 EEG channel may be switched to 5-8.
Detecting the faulty electrode is a simple matter as, with
one exception, one of the electrodes is always represented
in another channel. Clearly, if an electrode represented
in two channels is faulty both channels experience
interference; and if this is not the case, then the other
electrode is at fault. In one of the EOG channels, 3-5»
neither electrode appears on another channel. In this
case, the faulty electrode is determined by combining
both electrodes, in turn, with a third and observing which
combination still gives interference. In 'mixed' EEG
and EMG channels using one eye electrode - 4-8 and 1-6 -
eye movements picked up on these channels could be
discounted by referring to the simultaneous EOG tracing.
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REM-M AND REM-Q AWAKENINGS
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LENGTH OF DREAM REPORTS BY ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE
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TABLE 1V.1: MEAN NO. OF WORDS OF DREAM REPORTS
BY ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE
Fine Art Architecture Engineering p*(two-
tail edV
All wakings 47.9 89.2 64.1 n.i s
REM-M wakings 52.5 88.8 61.3 n., s
REM-Q wakings 45.1 94.7 63.3 n. s
Diff. between
REM-M and REM-Q
wakings +7.4 -5.9 -2.0 n., s
*Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance (Siegel, 1:
Within both fine art and architecture groups,
convergers and divergers follow their respective group
tendencies; and the anomalies in the engineering group
(see Chapter 5) appear to cancel each other out. As a
result, no distinguishing trend in the difference between
REM-M and REM-Q-related dreams emerges from any of the
academic disciplines. The architecture group appear to
produce much longer dream reports following both REM-M and
REM-Q awakenings, but this is entirely attributable to the
performance of two of the four subjects in this group, one
converger and one diverger.^
1 The two architects who reported their dreams at length
in fact both averaged over 120 words per dream from all
awakenings but still conformed with their respective
cognitive style groups on difference scores: the converger




LENGTH OF DREAM REPORTS BY OPEN-ENDED TEST PERFORMANCE
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TABLE V.I: MEAN NO. OF WORDS OF DREAM REPORTS






Scores All Wakings REM-M "Wakings REM-Q Waitings Wakings
-1.0 50.8 (n=27) 55.9 (n=13) 40.5 (n=l4) + 15.4
-0.5 27.2 (n= 5) 44.0 (n= 2) 16.0 (n= 3) +28.0
0.0 91.0 (n=i3) 95.7 (n= 8) 92.4 (n= 5) + 3.3
+0.5 64.9 (n=19) in00in (n= 9) 69.1 (n=10) -10.6
+ 1 .0 122.3 (n= 3) 1 10.0 (n= 2) 147.0 (n= 1) -37.0
+2.0 69.4 (n=l4) 54.4 (n= 9) 96.6 (n= 5) -42.2
The length of dreams collected from REM-M awakenings
follows no particular trend. The pattern following REM-Q
awakenings is also rather erratic; although, if the highest,
middle and lowest open-ended test categories are paired, the
length of dreams collected from REM-Q awakenings does
increase along with open-ended test performance. The most
striking and consistent finding, however, concerns the
difference scores between dreams collected from REM-Q
awakenings relative to those collected from REM-M awakenings.
As some success was achieved in matching open-ended
test performance for the convergent and divergent groups,
the data presented in Table V.1 appear, at first glance, to
contradict the earlier conclusion (from Table 5.5) that the
pattern of relatively longer dream reports following a
REM-Q awakening is a divergent trait: it seems as if this
pattern is at least as well accounted for by open-ended test
performance per se. Under closer scrutiny, however, this
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apparent contradiction dissolves: for the lowest open-
ended performance categories (-1.0 and -0.5) are found,
for the most part, to reflect convergent dream reporting
(3 convergers, 1 diverger); the middle range open-ended
categories (0.0 and 0.5) reflect both convergent and
divergent dream reporting equally (2 convergers and 2
divergers); and the highest levels of open-ended test
scoring (+1.0 and +2.0) reflect exclusively divergent dream
reporting. In other words, the matching of open-ended
test performance and convergence/divergence has, on this
occasion, broken down. This is attributable to the
exclusion of 2 subjects - 1 converger and 1 diverger - who
failed to provide any dreams from REM-Q awakenings and,
therefore, difference scores.
While we may have resolved the apparent discrepancy
between Table 5*5 and Table V.1, we are no nearer separating
the relative influences of convergence-divergence and open-
ended test performance on the dream difference scores. In
an attempt to clarify the picture, individual difference scores
were contrasted for convergence/divergence (both overall
and relative to the individual's academic group) and open-
ended test performance (Table V.2A) and the correlations
between the different variables computed (Table V.2B).
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TABLE V. 2 : DREAM DIFFERENCE SCORES - CONVERGENCE/
DIVERGENCE AND OPEN-ENDED TEST PERFORMANCE CONTRASTED
A. Individual Scores
Diff.
Score Overall con/di. Con/di. rel. acad. gp.
Open-ended
Scores
+34.8 extreme converger extreme converger -1.0
+28.0 moderate converger extreme converger -0.5
+20.5 extreme converger extreme converger 0.0
+ 6.6 moderate converger moderate converger -1.0
+ 4.6 moderate diverger moderate diverger -1.0
+ 4.4 moderate diverger extreme diverger +0.5
-14.0 extreme diverger moderate diverger 0.0
-25.7 moderate converger mod. con.. /all-rounder +0.5
-37.0 extreme diverger extreme diverger + 1 .0
-42.2 extreme diverger extreme diverger +2.0
B. Intercorrelations of the variables (Spearman rank
correlation)
Diff. Overall Con/di. rel,
Score con/di. acad. gp.
Overall con/di. .81*
Con/di. rel. acad. gp. .83* .88*
Open-ended score .75* .57** .67**
*p<.01; **p<.05
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From Table V.2A, it is evident visually that the
difference scores correspond to a high degree with both
measures of convergence/divergence. The one exception
is, once again, the convergent engineer who is only
marginally convergent relative to other engineers. The
open-ended scores, on the other hand, correspond generally
to a lesser extent with the difference scores: although
the renegade convergent engineer's difference score does
fit his open-ended performance rather better.
These impressions are confirmed in the correlation,
matrix (Table V.2B). Both convergent measures fit the
difference scores more closely than do the open-ended
scores, although the difference is not great. If the
marginal convergent engineer is excluded, the correlations
between the overall and academic group assessments of
convergence/divergence and the dream difference scores
increase to .92 and .88 respectively, while the
correlation between open-ended test performance and
difference scores remains unchanged (.76). However, the
association between convergence/divergence and open-ended
test scoring - despite the attempt to reduce it - makes it
impossible to distinguish, in this analysis, any independent
effects of open-ended test performance and convergence/
divergence with any degree of certainty.
160
APPENDIX VI ,
PUPATION OF REM ST-EEP IN THF.
REPLIO A TTotj STUDTE" ~
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There was some discrepancy (see Table 6.1)
between the original and replication studies in the amount
of rime spent in REM sleep, even when - as in the divergers'
case - total sleep time did not alter: both convergers and
divergers spent more time in REM sleep during the
replication. It is possible that the author, in the
original analysis, applied stricter criteria to the scoring
of REM sleep, particularly with regard to 'ambiguous' REM
sleep (see section on data analysis in Chapter 4), but this
could not account for much of the observed discrepancy.
Moreover, the difference between the two studies occurred
during the latter part of the night (see Table 6.2) when
ambiguous REM sleep is rare. However, the studies did
differ in another respect toward the end of the night.
During the running of the first 6 subjects (3 convergers
and 3 divergers) in the original experiment, subjects were
sometimes disturbed, toward morning, by traffic on its way
to the hospital kitchens nearby. Subsequent rerouting
removed this potentially disrupting influence. While
not necessarily waking the subjects, this traffic may
have disrupted REM sleep. Certainly, on one or two
occasions, the experimenter had observed a subject shifting
out of REM sleep following traffic noise.
In order to clarify this question, the recordings
of the 4 subjects (1 converger and 3 divergers) who
experienced the traffic in the original study and who also
participated in the traffic-free replication were compared
over the two conditions. As the disturbance occurred
162
between the hours of 5*30 a.m. and 6.30 a.m., any REM periods
completed during this hour, as well as any REM periods that
should have (but had not) occurred, were noted and compared
with comparably ranked REM periods from the same individual
recorded during the replication.
On the first baseline night in the original study,
the converger had no third or fourth REM period and in fact
1
awoke shortly after 5.30 a.m. and did not return to sleep;
on the other baseline night, this subject completed a third
REM period of 32.3 minutes before 5*30 a.m. but had no
fourth REM period. In the replication, by way of
comparison, this subject had third REM periods of 29.7 and
33.0 minutes and fourth REM periods of 45.0 and 43.3 minutes.
In this case, it looks as if the traffic disturbance has
robbed this converger of 3 REM periods totalling some 120
minutes of REM sleep over the course of two nights. One
diverger also had no fourth REM period on one baseline night
during the original study and, on the other night, a fourth
REM period lasting 20.7 minutes that finished before 6.30
a.m. In contrast, in the replication this diverger had
fourth REM periods lasting 53*3 and 49.3 minutes. A
second diverger had briefer and less consistent third REM
periods during the original study (21.7 16,7 minutes) -
1 On this night, the converger had only 5 hours 51 minutes
of sleep. This compared with sleeping times of at least
7 hours 10 minutes on his other 3 baseline nights. If
this night is excluded, the 4 convergers who participated
in both studies slept an average of only 10 minutes longer
in the replication (c.f. Table 6.1).
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both started before, but completed after, 5«30 a.m. -
than during the replication (39.3 and 38.0 minutes).
The third diverger followed a similar pattern on one baseline
night in the original study, completing a third REM period
of only 8.7 minutes shortly after 5.30 a.m., as against
third REM periods of 31.7 and 39.0 minutes in the replication.
These instances certainly suggest that the traffic
did disrupt some periods of REM sleep during the original
study. Moreover, the consistent duration of REM periods
within individuals on traffic-free nights encourages one to
assess the loss of REM sleep incurred on disturbed nights.
If the differences in the above-mentioned REM periods are
calculated, in the divergers' case these alone account for
the whole difference between the two studies in amount of
REM sleep. With the convergers, of course, no such
calculation could be attempted as 2 of the convergers who
experienced the traffic did not participate in the
replication and, as a result, no direct comparison between
nights with and without the traffic disturbance could be
made. Nevertheless, scrutiny of these 2 convergers'
tracings does suggest that both were affected by the
disturbance: in one subject, a 15 minute fourth REM period
completed between 5.30 a.m. and 6.30 a.m. on one night
as against a 30 minute fourth REM period completed after
6.30 a.m. on the other; in the second subject, a fourth
REM period of just 7 minutes occurring between 5.30 a.m.
and 6.30 a.m. on one night and no fourth REM period at all
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on the other night.
It seems, therefore, that REM sleep was affected
on no less than 5 of the 6 baseline nights that each
group experienced traffic. On one of the convergent
baseline nights sleep was severely disrupted and this
may account for the larger discrepancy in both total sleep
time and REM sleep between convergers and divergers in
the original study than in the replication (Table 6.1).
If the assessed loss of REM sleep arising out of this
one night is credited to the converger concerned, the
difference in amount of REM sleep during the latter part
of the night between convergers and divergers drops from
30.0 minutes to 23.9 minutes in the original study, as
against a difference of 21.1 minutes in the replication.
If the convergent group did lose, by virtue of this one
night, more REM sleep than the divergent group during the
original study, then the replication study may provide a
more valid comparison of the amount of REM sleep
experienced by convergers and divergers during the latter
half of the night: and, even here, there is an equally
significant, if smaller, difference. It seems reasonable
to conclude that the presence of the traffic in part of
the original study does not invalidate any overall
comparison between the two groups: the traffic was
experienced by an equal proportion (50$) of convergers and
divergers arid, with the exception of one night, both groups
appear to have been affected to a similar extent, at least
as far as the loss of REM sleep is concerned.
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However, while both groups seem to have lost a
similar amount of REM sleep overall as a result of the
traffic disturbance, it is still possible that the two
groups may have been differentially affected during the
third and fourth REM periods when these are looked at
individually. If this proves the case, it may
invalidate the conclusion (from Table 6.5) that third
and fourth REM periods of the night are longer for
divergers than convergers - a finding taken as additional
support for the use of intellectualisation on the part
of divergers.
¥ith the convergers, there was little difference
between their third REM periods over the two studies.
This fits the explanation based on traffic noise since
only 1 convergent third REM period appears to have been
affected in the original study and, as this period did not
occur, it was not included in the analysis. In contrast,
the convergers' fourth REM periods produced a difference
of 15.^ minutes between the original and replication
studies. As all 3 convergers who experienced the
traffic in the original study seem to have been affected
during their fourth REM periods, this is not too surprising;
particularly, as 1 of these 3 convergers had only one fourth
REM period lasting a mere 7 minutes which was, therefore,
his average, and a second converger who had no fourth REM
period in the original study (and, therefore, no average)
produced the longest convergent fourth REM period in the
replication. If, in the original study, the converger with
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the one 7-rainute fourth REM period is excluded and the 2
other affected convergers are credited with their average
fourth REM period duration on traffic-free nights, then
the convergent group averaged 31 «9 minutes for their fourth
REM period in the original study as against 38.3 minutes
in the replication, statistically an insignificant
difference.
Divergers were apparently affected during both
their third and fourth REM periods during the original
study, and this is reflected in Table 6.5. If disrupted
REM periods in the original study are credited with their
assessed losses, the mean duration of the third REM period
increases to 30.0 minutes as against the 35*^ minutes spent
in this REM period during the replication, again an
insignificant statistical difference; and adjusting the
only divergent fourth REM period disrupted in the original
study gave a mean fourth REM period duration of h"\ .h
minutes in the original study, identical to the fourth
REM period in the replication.
If, in the original study, the corrected values
of disrupted REM periods are substituted, the difference
in length, in Table 6.5, between convergers and
divergers1 third REM periods becomes statistically acceptable
(p=.09, two-tailed) and remains so for their fourth REM
periods, although at a reduced level (p=.08, two-tailed).
Moreover, these adjustments in the original study increase
the significance level of the convergent/divergent difference
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on the third REM period overall (p=.0l6, two-tailed) and
leave the significance level between their respective
fourth REM periods unaltered. It would seem that, when
disrupted REM periods in the original study are adjusted,
this accentuates rather than diminishes the differences
between convergers and divergers in time spent in the
third and fourth REM periods of the night.
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APPENDIX V11 s
REM SLEEP PATTERNING AND MECHANISMS OF DEFENCE
IN CONVERGERS AND DIVERGERS: A BIOCHEMICAL LINK?
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This investigation has highlighted intriguing
differences in the patterning of REM sleep displayed by
convergers and divergers: and these differences have been
attributed to their distinctive handling of threatening
dream experience. But both physiological and psychological
expression also echo biochemical events. As yet, we have
said nothing of this 'third world', the biochemistry under¬
lying sleep and dreams. To do so, of course, is to go
beyond the research presented here. But if we are to
complete the picture, however speculatively, it is to the
biochemistry that we must turn.
That biochemical events are indeed involved in
sleep is well illustrated by the following experiment. A
cat may be selectively deprived of REM sleep for several
days by placing him on a small support surrounded by water.
The cat still has NREM sleep but not REM sleep, since the
muscular atony which always accompanies REM sleep causes
the cat to fall into the water and awaken. Following
this deprivation, a long-lasting rebound of REM sleep (up
to 60$ of total sleep time on post-deprivation nights)
occurs which may last several days depending on the amount
of deprivation achieved. No mechanism, however
sophisticated, belonging to short-term neurophysiology
(synaptic potential) can explain this rebound phenomenon.
Thus any theory of sleep must invoke biochemical mechanisms.
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The identification, of groups of neurones containing
three monoamines - norepinephrine, dopamine and serotonin -
in cerebral systems known to be involved in sleep has
focused attention on these biogenic amines. A large
number of studies have confirmed that the metabolism of
these amines does play a role in regulating both NREM
and REM sleep. For example, reducing the levels of all
three amines in cats (by administering a single large dose
of reserpine) suppresses NREM sleep for 12 to 14 hours and
REM sleep for 2k hours (Delorme e_t al, 1965).
Subsequent research using more specific pharma¬
cological agents has attempted to clarify the role of the
individual amines. Decreasing levels of brain norepine¬
phrine and dopamine without affecting serotonin levels
(with alpha-methylparatyrosine) has been found to influence
REM sleep in animals although there is some disagreement as
to whether this procedure reduces REM sleep (Weitzman ejb al,
1969; Crowley ejt al, 1968) or increases it (King & Jewett,
1969; Hartmann et al, 1971b).^ Although the dosages
administered in these studies were similar in absolute terms,
both studies that reported a decrease in REM sleep used
monkeys whereas the two studies reporting an increase used
cats or rats. This suggests that the different effects
observed may be attributable to the relative dosages
1 As dopamine precedes norepinephrine on the same
biochemical pathway, it is not possible to impair the
synthesis or catabolism of dopamine without also affecting
norepinephrine.
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administered as, presumably, the levels used represent
a less acute dose for the monkey than for either the cat
or rat. In support of this, a further study with cats
reported an initial decrease in REM sleep followed by an
increase (iskander & Kaelbling, 1970). Selectively
impairing the synthesis of norepinephrine alone (with
Disulfiram) has also been found to suppress REM sleep in
cats (Jouvet, 1969). The conclusion that norepinephrine
is involved in the regulation of REM sleep is strengthened
by the observation of an increased turnover of cerebral
norepinephrine during the rebound of REM sleep following
its selective deprivation in the rat (Pujol e_t aT, 1968).
A more fundamental controversy surrounds the role
of serotonin in sleep. Selectively inhibiting the
synthesis of serotonin with para-chlorophenylalanine (PCPA)
produces a profound insomnia (e.g., Delorme ejb al, 1966)
and biochemical analysis has confirmed that the decrease
in brain serotonin and the decrease in sleep go hand in
hand (jouvet, 1969). Moreover, an insomniac cat enters
normal sleep (both NREM and REM) shortly after being
injected intraperitoneally with 5-Hydroxytryptophan (5-HTP),
a precursor of serotonin. These findings have usually
been interpreted (e.g., Jouvet, 19^9; Veitzman, 19^9) as
evidence of the involvement of serotonin in NREM sleep.
However, Dement (1969) has shown that sleep gradually
returns to normal over the course of about 10 days although
the brain still lacks serotonin. To account for this,
Dement suggested instead that the insomnia is a side effect
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of the disturbance brought about by the preceding
. . t t
emergence of pontine-geniculate-occiptal (PGO) spiking
2
into waking bahaviour. Sleep returns because these
freely-discharging PGO spikes appear to gradually lose
their power to disturb the animal. Dement concluded
that it is the loss of control of the phasic events
normally associated with REM sleep that is the primary
effect of reducing the level of brain serotonin.
In support of Dement's interpretation, the
dissociation of tonic and phasic features of REM sleep
has only been observed in studies that have lowered the
level of brain serotonin. Moreover, restoring brain
serotonin (with 5-HTP) in cats previously given reserpine
or PCPA promptly suppresses the freely-discharging PGO
O
spikes (Delorme e_fc al, 19^55 Dement, 1969)* Although
the tonic features of REM sleep seem to be dependent on
norepinephrine levels, it is possible that serotonin levels -
by regulating phasic discharge - also indirectly influence
time spent in REM sleep. For REM sleep rebound has only
been observed in studies in which phasic as well as tonic
features of REM sleep have been suppressed: and Dement (1969)
has confirmed that what determines the amount of rebound
2 These PGO spikes, observable in the EEG, are phasic
features normally largely confined to REM sleep. When this
phasic activity is discharged during the waking state, cats
give every indication of hallucinating (Dement, 1969).
3 The restoration of brain norepinephrine and dopamine
(with dopa) on the other hand, has no immediate effect on
the uncontrolled discharge of phasic events, although
tonic features of REM sleep return.
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following REM sleep suppression is the accumulation of
undischarged phasic events, not tonic REM sleep.
Brain Serotonin Levels and REM Sleep Patterning
Investigations with human subjects strengthen
the suggestion that levels of brain serotonin may
influence both tonic and phasic features of REM sleep.
Bolstering levels of brain serotonin (with tryptophan or
5-HTP) increases both the duration of REM sleep and eye
movement profusion within REM sleep (Mandell ejt ad, 1964;
Evans & Oswald, 1966; Hartmann, 1967; Wyatt e_t al,
1971a; Griffiths et ad, 1972). Non-REM sleep seems
to be unaffected in the majority of studies.^ Duration
of REM sleep is also positively associated with levels
of 'free' tryptophan in plasma (Chen e_t ad, 1974) which,
in turn, may influence the concentration (e.g., Moir &
Eccleston, 1968) and rate of turnover (e.g., Knott &
Curson, 1972) of brain serotonin. Reducing brain serotonin
by administering PCPA has had variable effects according to
the level of dosage. A small but increasing dosage has
produced a slight but consistent increase in REM sleep and
a substantial decrease in the profusion of both eye
movements and phasic integrated potentials (PIPs)
4 Only one study seems in serious disagreement with these
findings. Wyatt et al. (l970a) reported an increase in NREM
sleep, but a decrease in REM sleep and eye movement profusion
after the administration of tryptophan. Perhaps significantly,
all 5 of their subjects were young women. The study might have
been confounded by fluctuating levels of oestrogen, as these are
known to influence the metabolic pathway of tryptophan (e.g.,
Rose, 1969). As REM sleep also decreased when tryptophan was
given in conjunction with PCPA (to cancer sufferers), the
investigators concluded that trytophan produced its sleep
effects through a non-serotonin mechanism. However, this
dosage of PCPA (2g/24 hours) would in any case be expected to
decrease REM sleep (see below).
5 These PIPs are phasic features similar to PGO spikes in
animals.
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within REM sleep (Cheraik e_t al, 1973)*^ Earlier studies,
however, have reported a marked decrease in REM sleep in
cancer patients after 2 to 3 weeks of a relatively high
dose (2-hg/2h hours) of PCPA (Wyatt et_ ad, 1969; Wyatt ejb al,
ry
1971b). On this dosage, a four-fold increase in the
non-REM:REM ratio of PIP discharge was also recorded (Wyatt
et al, 1971b). Finally, a small dose of 5-HTP given to a
PCPA-treated subject has produced a significant increase
in eye movement profusion within REM sleep but not in
duration of REM sleep, whereas a larger dose did lengthen
REM sleep (Wyatt ejt al, 1969; Wyatt ejt al, 1970b).
To summarise, it appears that increasing levels of
brain serotonin above normal produces an increase in both
REM sleep duration and eye movement profusion within REM
sleep. Yet decreasing levels of brain serotonin by a
relatively small extent also results in an increase in
REM sleep, but with a decrease in the profusion of phasic
features (eye movements, PIPs) within REM sleep. A further
reduction in serotonin levels produces a decrease in REM
sleep and a further decrease in phasic discharge within
6 This study in particular must be viewed with extreme
caution as the data were collected from a single methadone
addict during the course of his withdrawal programme.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that, even in
animal studies using large doses, "the first dose of PCPA
has no observable effect, except that the REM time is
generally a little higher" (my emphasis') (Dement, 1969) •
7 A similar reversal of effect on the duration of REM
sleep has been noted with different doses of reserpine.
Whereas carefully controlled doses have increased REM sleep
in man (Tissot, 1965; Hartmann, 1966b; Hoffman & Domino
1969; Coulter et al. 1971 )» larger doses in animal studies
have suppressed REM sleep (e.g., Delorme et_ al, 1965).
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REM sleep (at least relative to NREM sleep). Finally, a
still more acute reduction in serotonin (in animal studies)
leads to a loss of sleep altogether.
If we accept the following assumptions, these
apparently contradictory findings may fall into place:
1. Increasing (or decreasing) the level of brain
serotonin results in more (or less) rigorously
controlled phasic expression, which takes the
form of a temporal compression (or dispersion)
of these phasic events (after Dement, 1969)?
2. There is an upper limit to the compression of phasic
events j
3. Phasic events trigger and maintain REM sleep, but
as they become increasingly dispersed they
gradually lose their power to do this; and
b. Increasing (or decreasing) brain serotonin levels
increases (or decreases) the incidence, as well as
the compression, of phasic events within REM sleep.
First, consider the effect of raising serotonin
levels. With a small increase, REM sleep may not alter
as increased phasic discharge is counteracted by increased
compression. Alternatively, if the compression of phasic
events outstrips their increased incidence, REM sleep may
shorten. However, once the postulated ceiling level of
compression is reached (Figure V11.1, point C), a further
increase in the incidence of phasic events can only be
accommodated by the expansion of REM sleep. A small
decrease in brain serotonin levels (up to point A, Figure
V1 1.1 ) produces a slight dispersion of phasic events, but
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FIGURE VII.I
POSTULATED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BRAIN SEROTONIN
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insufficient to seriously affect the ability of these
phasic events to regulate REM sleep (in absolute terms,
there was no increase in non-REM phasic activity in
Chernik ejt al_'s study). As a result, REM sleep may
expand slightly to accommodate the increased spread of
g
phasic discharge. With further decreases in serotonin,
greater dispersion of phasic events takes place resulting
in a decreasing ability to trigger and maintain REM sleep
(hence the four-fold increase in non-REMsREM phasic
discharge). This interpretation also allows for the
variable effects of different doses of 5-HTP given to PCPA-
treated patients. A small dose of 5-HTP produced no
increase in the duration of REM sleep because the increase
in phasic discharge could be accommodated in a similar
duration of REM sleep as the compression limit had not been
reached. With a larger dose of 5-HTP, however, a greater
increase in the incidence of phasic events could not be
compressed into a similar duration of REM sleep.
If this interpretation is on the right lines, the
effect of increasing or decreasing levels of brain
serotonin will depend both on the amount of this increase or
decrease and the existing levels of serotonin. According
8 There also appears to be a slight decrease in the
incidence of phasic events. For there was a 26.4$ decrease
in percentage PIP discharge and an 18.5$ decrease in
percentage eye movement activity during REM sleep, yet only
a 10.3$ increase in the duration of REM sleep (Chernik et_ al.
1973).
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to Figure V11 .1, large increases or decreases will
inevitably lengthen or shorten, respectively, the
duration of REM sleep. Smaller shifts (in either
direction) from normal levels, on the other hand, may
produce a decrease, no change or an increase in REM sleep
duration, according to whether changes in the compression
of phasic events outstrip, keep pace with, or fall behind
changes in the incidence of phasic events. As for eye
movement profusion, increasing serotonin levels will
increase profusion rates until the compression ceiling
is reached; and decreasing levels of serotonin will
decrease profusion rates below the compression ceiling.
One final point. In this discussion we have
argued that phasic discharge and, as a result, REM sleep
are influenced by. shifts in the level of brain serotonin.
This is not necessarily to suggest that it is the prevailing
level of brain serotonin per se that regulates phasic
discharge: it might equally involve the rate of synthesis
or catabolisra of serotonin.^ view of this, it seems
least presumptive to refer to changes in the rate of brain
serotonin turnover in pursuing the argument.
9 The three are, of course, mutually interdependent;
existing levels of brain serotonin influence both rates
of synthesis and rate of catabolism, as well as vice
versa. (e.g., Ashcroft _et al, 1969).
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REM sleep patterning, defensive orientation and brain
serotonin turnover in convergers and divergers.
On the above interpretation, the differences
observed between convergent and divergent REM sleep
patterns might be linked with different rates of brain
serotonin turnover. The convergers' pattern of shorter,
more intense periods of REM sleep suggests that they turn
over serotonin at a higher rate during REM sleep than do
divergers. Perhaps most striking, the convergent pattern
of a short REM latency along with a relatively long,
intense first REM period of the night is precisely the
effect produced by feeding subjects tryptophan prior to
retiring (Oswald crt al, 1964, 1966; Evans & Oswald, 1966;
Griffiths _et al, 1972). Is there any reason for hypo¬
thesising that convergers might indeed turn over more
serotonin during REM sleep than divergers?
Increasing the rate of brain serotonin turnover
also affects waking behaviour. Administering 5-HTP or
tryptophan produces slight euphoria, a mild feeling of
drunkenness and a tendency to lewd conversation (Oswald
et al, 1966) and has even led to complaints from nursing
staff (Smith & Prockop, 1962), This suggests that brain
serotonin turnover is associated not only with phasic
discharge but also with drive expression whether in dreams
or while awake. But the convergers' life style suggests
a primary repressive orientation toward drive expression
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during tlie day.10 This inhibition may be reflected,
at a biochemical level, in a severe restriction of brain
serotonin turnover while awake. If this were the case,
then an accumulating need to turn over serotonin would
build up during the day. This, in turn, would create a
greater pressure to enter REM sleep so that this need
might be safely discharged. Moreover, once in REM
sleep, the very power of convergers1 repressive handling
of threatening dream experience makes it safe to allow
relatively unrestricted drive expression and brain serotonin
turnover. In other words, it is speculated that the
convergent pattern of a short REM latency along with a
longer first REM period is a response to the severe
restriction imposed upon brain serotonin turnover by day
and reflects more immediate serotonin turnover once asleep;
and the night-long profuse eye movement activity within
REM sleep expressed by convergers reflects relatively
unrestricted brain serotonin turnover.
Divergers, too, presumably express more drive and
turn over more brain serotonin during REM sleep than
during the day. But the difference may be less acute
than is the case with convergers. On the one hand,
divergers1 less rigorous defences may permit rather more day-
10 Primary repression refers to the inhibition of
threatening psychic experience before it is expressed;
secondary repression refers to the inhibition of psychic
experience after it has been expressed. The phenomenon we
have attempted to demonstrate in the present study is secondary
repression - the expulsion of dreams from consciousness after
they have been consciously experienced.
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time expression, of drive and this may be reflected in a
less restricted turnover of brain serotonin by day.
On the other, divergers1 handling of dream experience may
result in their still exercising more constraint on drive
expression during dreams, and therefore brain serotonin
turnover during REM sleep, than convergers. As a result,
divergers experience less urgency to enter REM sleep than
convergers and, when it comes, a slower rate of brain
serotonin turnover generating less profuse eye movement
activity.
In offering this account of how defensive mechanisms
might influence, and interact with, the biochemical
processes that appear to regulate REM sleep patterning, we
have gone some way beyond evidence that is, in itself,
fraught with difficulty. For interpretation of pharma¬
cological data is based on an assumption that may often
prove unjustified: that the only relevant effect of drug
intervention is the one being measured. The intimacy of
biochemical processes - among themselves and with physiol¬
ogical systems - makes this a fragile assumption. It may
be premature to try and make sense of data generated by
research still in its infancy. The justification - if
there be one - of indulging in speculation must be that,
far from proving idle, it may serve to sharpen the attack
of future research in this area.
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